GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v
Fix: parse-community/parse-server#10489GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in parse-server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
parse-servernpmDescription
Impact
The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses.
Patches
A filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc.
Workarounds
Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | parse-server | ≥ 9.0.0&&< 9.9.1-alpha.4 | 9.9.1-alpha.4 |
| 📦npm | parse-server | all versions | 8.6.79 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for parse-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update parse-server to 9.9.1-alpha.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.