How severe is GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr?

GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr has a CVSS score of 9.8/10, rated CRITICAL. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr?

GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr affects the following packages: propel/propel (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr?

Update propel/propel to 2.0.0-alpha8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for propel/propel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr was published on May 20, 2024 and was last updated on December 5, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr

CRITICAL

Propel2 SQL injection possible with limit() on MySQL

Published

May 20, 2024

Updated

Dec 5, 2024

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘propel/propel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL.

For example, given a model User for a table users:

UserQuery::create()->limit('1;DROP TABLE users')->find();

This will drop the users table!

The cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Propel\Runtime\ActiveQuery\Criteria::setLimit() or in Propel\Runtime\Adapter\Pdo\MysqlAdapter::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers.

This is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an ORM is to prevent basic SQL injection.

This affects all versions of Propel: 1.x, 2.x, and 3.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`propel/propel`	≥ 2.0.0-alpha1&&< 2.0.0-alpha8	2.0.0-alpha8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for propel/propel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update propel/propel to 2.0.0-alpha8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL. For example, given a model User for a table users: ``` UserQuery::create()->limit('1;DROP TABLE users')->find(); ``` This will drop the users table! The cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Propel\Runtime\ActiveQuery\Criteria::setLimit() or in Propel\Runtime\Adapter\Pdo\MysqlAdapter::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers. This is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an OR

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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