How severe is GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw has a CVSS score of 7.5/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw affects the following packages: pnpm (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

Update pnpm to 10.26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 14th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw?

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw is classified as CWE-494 (CWE-494). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw was published on January 7, 2026 and was last updated on February 3, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

HIGH

pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies

Also known asCVE-2025-69263

Published

Jan 7, 2026

Updated

Feb 3, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk14th percentile+0.22%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

pnpmnpm

115.2Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

A server that returns different tarball content on each request
A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`pnpm`	all versions	10.26.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pnpm to 10.26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. ### Details When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash: `resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`: ```javascript return { resolution: { tarball: resolvedUrl, // No integrity field }, resolvedVia: 'url', } ``` The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify: ```y

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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