How severe is GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg?

GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg affects the following packages: phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg?

Update phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc to 4.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg was published on January 11, 2023 and was last updated on November 28, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg

XML-RPC for PHP's `Wrapper::buildClientWrapperCode` method allows code injection via malicious `$client` argument

Published

Jan 11, 2023

Updated

Nov 28, 2024

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In order for this weakness to be exploited, the following conditions have to apply, at the same time:

method Wrapper::buildClientWrapperCode, or any methods which depend on it, such as Wrapper::wrapXmlrpcServer, Wrapper::wrapXmlrpcMethod or Wrapper::buildWrapMethodSource must be in use. Note that they are not used by default in either the Client or Server classes provided by the library; the developer has to specifically make use of them in his/her own code
the $client argument to either of those methods should have been built with malicious data, ie. data controlled by a 3rd party, passed to its constructor call

This is most likely an uncommon usage scenario, and as such the chances of exploitation may be low.

NB the graphical debugger which is shipped as part of the library is vulnerable to this, when used with the option "Generate stub for method call" selected. In that case, the debugger will display but not execute the malicious code, which would have to be provided via carefully crafted values for the "Address" and "Path" inputs.

The attack scenario in this case is that a developer copies into his/her own source code the php snippet generated by the debugger, in a situation where the debugger is used with "Address"/"Path" input values supplied by a 3rd party. The malicious payload in the "Address"/"Path" input values should be easily recognized as suspicious by any barely proficient developer, as it resembles a bog-standard injection attack. It goes without saying that a responsible developer should not blindly copy and paste into his/her own code anything generated by a 3rd party tool, such as the phpxmlrpc debugger, without giving it at least a cursory scan.

Originally reported as issue #80

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc`	all versions	4.9.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update phpxmlrpc/phpxmlrpc to 4.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In order for this weakness to be exploited, the following conditions have to apply, at the same time: - method `Wrapper::buildClientWrapperCode`, or any methods which depend on it, such as `Wrapper::wrapXmlrpcServer`, `Wrapper::wrapXmlrpcMethod` or `Wrapper::buildWrapMethodSource` must be in use. Note that they are _not_ used by default in either the Client or Server classes provided by the library; the developer has to specifically make use of them in his/her own code - the `$client` argument to either of those methods should have been built with malicious data, ie. data controlled by a 3rd

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7vcx-v65q-9wpg across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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