GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434
CRITICALOAuth2-Proxy has authentication bypass in oauth2-proxy skip_auth_routes due to Query Parameter inclusion
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
This vulnerability affects oauth2-proxy deployments using the skip_auth_routes configuration option with regex patterns. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass authentication by crafting URLs with query parameters that satisfy the configured regex patterns, potentially gaining unauthorized access to protected resources.
The issue stems from skip_auth_routes matching against the full request URI (path + query parameters) instead of just the path as documented. This discrepancy enables authentication bypass attacks where attackers append malicious query parameters to access protected endpoints.
Example Attack:
- Configuration:
skip_auth_routes = [ "^/foo/.*/bar$" ] - Intended behavior: Allow
/foo/something/bar - Actual vulnerability: Also allows
/foo/critical_endpoint?param=/bar
Deployments using skip_auth_routes with regex patterns containing wildcards or broad matching patterns are most at risk, especially when backend services ignore unknown query parameters.
Patches
A patch has been released with version v7.11.0.
Workarounds
Immediate mitigations:
- Review regex patterns: Audit all
skip_auth_routesconfigurations for overly permissive patterns - Use precise patterns: Replace wildcard patterns with exact path matches where possible
- Anchor patterns: Ensure regex patterns are properly anchored (start with
^and end with$) - Path-only matching: Consider implementing custom validation that strips query parameters before regex matching
Example secure configuration:
# Instead of: "^/public/.*"
# Use specific paths: "^/public/assets$", "^/public/health$"
skip_auth_routes = ["^/public/assets$", "^/public/health$", "^/api/status$"]
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | all versions | 7.11.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.11.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7rh7-c77v-6434 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.