GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf
HIGHMissing proper state, nonce and PKCE checks for OAuth authentication
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
next-authnpmDescription
Impact
next-auth applications using OAuth provider versions before v4.20.1 are affected.
A bad actor who can spy on the victim's network or able to social engineer the victim to click a manipulated login link could intercept and tamper with the authorization URL to log in as the victim, bypassing the CSRF protection.
As an example, an attack can happen in the following scenario.
TL;DR: The attacker steals the victim's authenticated callback by intercepting and tampering with the authorization URL created by
next-auth.
-
The victim attempts to log in to the
next-authsite. For example https://next-auth-example.vercel.app/ -
<img width="1971" alt="Screen Shot 2023-03-03 at 09 54 26" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/31528554/222619750-a2062bb8-99eb-4985-a75c-d75acd3da67e.png">next-authsets thecheckscookies according to how the OAuth provider is configured. In this case,stateandpkceare set by default for the Google Provider. -
The attacker intercepts the returned authorization URL, strips away the OAuth check (nonce, state, pkce), and returns the URL without the check to the victim's browser. For example: From
https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth/oauthchooseaccount?client_id=client_id&scope=openid%20email%20profile&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fnext-auth-example.vercel.app%2Fapi%2Fauth%2Fcallback%2Fgoogle&state=state&code_challenge=code_challenge&code_challenge_method=S256&service=lso&o2v=2&flowName=GeneralOAuthFlowtohttps://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth/oauthchooseaccount?client_id=client_id&scope=openid%20email%20profile&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fnext-auth-example.vercel.app%2Fapi%2Fauth%2Fcallback%2Fgoogle&service=lso&o2v=2&flowName=GeneralOAuthFlow. Notice the parametersstate,code_challengeandcode_verifierare removed from the victim's address bar. -
The victim attempts to log in using their OAuth account.
-
The Authorization Server logs the victim in and calls back to the
next-authapi/auth/callback/:providerIdendpoint. 5.1. The attacker intercepts and logs this callback URL for later use. 5.2.next-authchecks the callback call from OAuth Authorization Server (doesn't have checks) and compares the checks with the cookies set (has checks) at step 2. This check will fail, resulting in the victim isn't logged in. However, at this step, the Authorization Server has already accepted the victim's request to log in and generated/sent acodein the URL. -
The attacker now has an authorization URL with the
codethat the AS will exchange for validaccess_token/id_tokenand can log in as the victim automatically. They can open a new browser window and paste in the URL logged at step 5.1 and log in as the victim.
Patches
We patched the vulnerability in next-auth v4.20.1
To upgrade, run one of the following:
npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest
Workarounds
Upgrading to latest is the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using Advanced Initialization, developers can manually check the callback request for state, pkce, and nonce against the provider configuration, and abort the sign-in process if there is a mismatch. Check out the source code for help.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | next-auth | all versions | 4.20.1 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for next-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update next-auth to 4.20.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7r7x-4c4q-c4qf across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.