How severe is GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g?

GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g affects the following packages: github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5 (Go), github.com/cosmos/interchain-security (Go), github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v2 (Go), github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v3 (Go), github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v4 (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g?

Update github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5 to 5.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g was published on September 5, 2024 and was last updated on September 6, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g: v5

Blast Radius

5 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5🐹github.com/cosmos/interchain-security🐹github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v2🐹github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v3🐹github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Context

ICS has the following four messages that enable validators on the provider chain to perform different actions:

MsgOptIn -- adds a validator to the consumer chain’s active set
MsgOptOut -- removes a validator from the consumer chain’s active set
MsgAssignConsumerKey -- changes the consensus key used for a validator’s operations on a consumer chain
MsgSetConsumerCommissionRate -- sets a validator’s consumer-specific commission rate

Normally, only the respective validators are allowed to perform these actions.

Issue

The upgrade to SDK 0.50, introduced a signer field to these messages. This field is used to authenticate the user sending the message to the system. However, there was no validation on the ICS side to check if the signer matches the provider address.

As a result, any user could opt-in, opt-out, change the commission rate, or change what public key a validator uses on a consumer chain.

For more context, check out the code:

Severity assessment

The severity assessment is based on this framework.

Potential impact: Catastrophic

By changing consumer keys for 1/3+ of a consumer chain's validator set, any user could cause a consumer chain to halt. Given that the consumer is down, the provider will jail provider validators for consumer downtime, so this exploit would not have impacted the provider directly. Consumer chain halts would need to be addressed by a provider-side patch.
By changing consumer keys on a consumer node, double signing, and submitting evidence back to the provider, any user could tombstone any provider validator. This would cause the provider's active set to change. At scale, this exploit could be applied to all active provider validators and a well-funded attacker could then run their own nodes and take over consensus on the provider and on consumer chains.

Likelihood: Rare

The bug was discovered internally. There is no evidence that any external party has identified this vulnerability.
The bug has been live for two weeks with no issues.
All four message types are ones that only validators use, and rarely use in daily operations.
In the Cosmos Hub’s recent history (May - Aug), there has been only one instance of any of these message types, which was performed in accordance with chain rules.
The catastrophic exploits (such as tombstoning the entire validator set of the provider) are also extremely complex. They involve several operations that are not well-understood by many people, and the entire exploit must occur quickly and at-scale to avoid other node operators responding defensively.

Affected Packages

5 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5`	≥ 5.1.0&&< 5.2.0	5.2.0
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/interchain-security`	all versions	No fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v2`	all versions	No fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v3`	all versions	No fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v4`	all versions	No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/v5 to 5.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7q74-g774-7x3g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Context ICS has the following four messages that enable validators on the provider chain to perform different actions: - `MsgOptIn` -- adds a validator to the consumer chain’s active set - `MsgOptOut` -- removes a validator from the consumer chain’s active set - `MsgAssignConsumerKey` -- changes the consensus key used for a validator’s operations on a consumer chain - `MsgSetConsumerCommissionRate` -- sets a validator’s consumer-specific commission rate Normally, only the respective validators are allowed to perform these actions. ### Issue The upgrade to SDK 0.50, introduced a [sig

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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