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GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27

OpenClaw macOS deep link confirmation truncation can conceal executed agent message

Also known asCVE-2026-26320
Published
Feb 17, 2026
Updated
Feb 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk34th percentile+0.41%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.93%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
4.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the openclaw:// URL scheme. For openclaw://agent deep links without an unattended key, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked "Run".

At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta.

An attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed.

Impact

If a user runs the deep link, the agent may perform actions that can lead to arbitrary command execution depending on the user's configured tool approvals/allowlists. This is a social-engineering mediated vulnerability: the confirmation prompt could be made to misrepresent the executed message.

Affected Versions

  • OpenClaw macOS desktop client versions >= 2026.2.6 and <= 2026.2.13.

Fixed Versions

  • 2026.2.14.

Mitigations

  • Do not approve unexpected "Run OpenClaw agent?" prompts triggered while browsing untrusted sites.
  • Use unattended deep links only with a valid key for trusted personal automations.

Resolution

Unkeyed deep links now enforce a strict message length limit for confirmation and ignore delivery/routing knobs (deliver, to, channel) unless a valid unattended key is provided.

Fix commit: 28d9dd7a772501ccc3f71457b4adfee79084fe6f


Fix commit 28d9dd7a772501ccc3f71457b4adfee79084fe6f confirmed on main and in v2026.2.14. Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.14.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclaw2026.2.6-0&&< 2026.2.142026.2.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked "Run". At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta. An attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually executed. ###
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7q2j-c4q5-rm27 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.