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🐘 Packagist

GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq

DynamicPageList3 vulnerability exposes hidden/suppressed usernames

Also known asCVE-2025-53625
Published
Jul 10, 2025
Updated
Jul 10, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk36th percentile+0.31%
0.00%0.32%0.63%0.95%0.1%0.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘universal-omega/dynamic-page-list3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Several #dpl parameters can leak usernames that have been hidden using revision deletion, suppression, or the hideuser block flag.

Details

The parameters adduser, addauthor, and addlasteditor output the page creator or last editor using the %USER% placeholder. These display the actual username, even when that name has been hidden using revision deletion, suppression (oversight), or hideuser.

The %CONTRIBUTOR% placeholder, used with addcontribution, behaves similarly and also reveals hidden usernames.

In addition, the following parameters can expose suppressed usernames when combined with %USER% or similar output placeholders:

  • lastrevisionbefore
  • allrevisionsbefore
  • firstrevisionsince
  • allrevisionssince

These parameters reference specific revisions and allow output of user-related metadata. If a username has been hidden from those revisions, it may still appear in the output.

Further, the parameters createdby, notcreatedby, modifiedby, notmodifiedby, lastmodifiedby, and notlastmodifiedby accept usernames as input. When the correct (suppressed) username is used, the query may return matching pages or edits. This can reveal the presence and association of a hidden identity, even if not displayed directly. However, this is a more indirect exposure than the output parameters mentioned above.

Proof of Concept

  1. Create a page while logged in as a user.
  2. Revision delete or suppress the username from the page history.
  3. Use a DPL query with one of the affected parameters.
  4. The output reveals the hidden username.

Example

The following query reveals the suppressed username Example user:

{{#dpl:
| title = File:Example.png
| addauthor = true
| format = ,%USER%,,
}}

Similar behavior occurs using parameters like lastrevisionbefore with %USER% in the format string.

Impact

This issue causes the exposure of usernames that were intentionally hidden by administrators. It directly undermines revision deletion, user suppression, and block-related privacy measures. In some cases, usernames can be revealed both directly through output and indirectly through query behavior.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistuniversal-omega/dynamic-page-list3all versions3.6.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for universal-omega/dynamic-page-list3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update universal-omega/dynamic-page-list3 to 3.6.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Several `#dpl` parameters can leak usernames that have been hidden using revision deletion, suppression, or the `hideuser` block flag. ### Details The parameters `adduser`, `addauthor`, and `addlasteditor` output the page creator or last editor using the `%USER%` placeholder. These display the actual username, even when that name has been hidden using revision deletion, suppression (oversight), or `hideuser`. The `%CONTRIBUTOR%` placeholder, used with `addcontribution`, behaves similarly and also reveals hidden usernames. In addition, the following parameters can expose suppress
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-7pgw-q3qp-6pgq: universal-omega/dynamic-p… | O3 Security