GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6
Plonk verifier KZG multi point verification
Blast Radius
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Description
Impact
The vulnerability allows a third party to derive a valid proof from a valid initial tuple {proof, public_inputs}, corresponding to the same public inputs as the initial proof. It is due to a randomness being generated using a small part of the scratch memory describing the state, allowing for degrees of freedom in the transcript.
Note that the impact is limited to the PlonK verifier smart contract.
Patches
We still use a hash function on some data to have a pseudo rng, but instead of hashing the first 32 bytes of the state (
let random := mod(keccak256(state, 0x20), r_mod) )
we hash the whole state at this point of the verifier as if it was a Fiat Shamir transcript:
mstore(mPtr, mload(add(state, STATE_FOLDED_DIGESTS_X)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x20), mload(add(state, STATE_FOLDED_DIGESTS_Y)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x40), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_BATCH_OPENING_AT_ZETA_X)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x60), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_BATCH_OPENING_AT_ZETA_Y)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x80), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_GRAND_PRODUCT_COMMITMENT_X)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0xa0), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_GRAND_PRODUCT_COMMITMENT_Y)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0xc0), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_OPENING_AT_ZETA_OMEGA_X)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0xe0), calldataload(add(aproof, PROOF_OPENING_AT_ZETA_OMEGA_Y)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x100), mload(add(state, STATE_ZETA)))
mstore(add(mPtr, 0x120), mload(add(state, STATE_GAMMA_KZG)))
let random := staticcall(gas(), 0x2, mPtr, 0x140, mPtr, 0x20)
Workarounds
In the function batch_verify_multi_points, the variable random (corresponding to u in the paper, step 12 of the plonk verification process) should depend on state_folded_digests_x, state_folded_digests_y, proof_grand_product_commitment_x, proof_grand_product_commitment_y and state_zeta (by hashing those values for instance).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/consensys/gnark | all versions | 0.9.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/consensys/gnark. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/consensys/gnark to 0.9.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7p92-x423-vwj6 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.