GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6
Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack
Blast Radius
github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylonReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, an attacker can use the typically 20-byte address bytes (from the PoP context) to form the StartHeight, NumPubRand, and a shorter-than-expected Commitment (e.g., 4 bytes). The replayed signature will pass verification for this crafted message, leading to the injection of an invalid PubRand commitment.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, specifically via the PoP signature replay, allows an attacker to store an invalid PubRand commitment (with a non-standard length, e.g., 4 bytes) for a targeted Finality Provider (FP). Despite the commitment itself being malformed, it's the associated StartHeight and NumPubRand (derived from the replayed address bytes and typically very large) that cause severe consequences
Future recommendations
To minimize future risk of such attacks, all finality providers should:
- Never re-use your finality provider EOTS across the networks (e.g., the testnet) or for any other purpose.
- Never use EOTS keys to sign any other data than relevant to in-protocol messages. Ideally EOTS key should only be used to:
- Sign initial proof of possession message
- Sign periodic randomness commits
- Sign finality votes with every block
Finder
Vulnerability discovered by:
- Marco Hextor
- https://x.com/marcohextor
- @marcohextor
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon | all versions | 1.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon to 1.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.