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📦 npm

GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p

HIGH

SVG Dimension Capping Bypass via XML Comment Injection in @dicebear/converter ensureSize()

Also known asCVE-2026-33418
Published
Mar 20, 2026
Updated
Mar 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk29th percentile+0.35%
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.88%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦@dicebear/converter

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The ensureSize() function in @dicebear/converter used a regex-based approach to rewrite SVG width/height attributes, capping them at 2048px to prevent denial of service. This size capping could be bypassed by crafting SVG input that causes the regex to match a non-functional occurrence of <svg before the actual SVG root element. When the SVG is subsequently rendered via @resvg/resvg-js on the Node.js code path, it renders at the attacker-specified dimensions, potentially causing out-of-memory crashes.

Details

The vulnerable function used String.prototype.replace() with a non-global regex to find and rewrite the first <svg tag's dimensions. Since the regex does not distinguish between <svg appearing inside non-element XML constructs and the actual SVG root element, a crafted input can cause the regex to match a decoy instead of the real element, leaving the actual SVG dimensions unclamped.

In the Node.js rendering path, renderAsync from @resvg/resvg-js was called without a fitTo constraint, so it would render at whatever dimensions the SVG element specified — potentially allocating gigabytes of memory.

The browser code path is not vulnerable because it uses the clamped size return value from ensureSize() to set canvas.width and canvas.height directly.

Impact

Any application that passes untrusted or user-supplied SVG content through @dicebear/converter's Node.js conversion functions (toPng, toJpeg, toWebp, toAvif) is vulnerable to denial of service via excessive memory allocation. Note that @dicebear/converter can be used independently of DiceBear's avatar generation — any SVG string can be passed to the conversion functions.

The impact is limited to availability — there is no data disclosure or integrity impact. The browser code path is not affected.

Fix

The regex-based approach has been replaced with XML-aware processing using fast-xml-parser to correctly identify and modify the SVG root element's attributes. Additionally, a fitTo constraint has been added to the renderAsync call as defense-in-depth, ensuring the rendered output is always bounded regardless of SVG content.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@dicebear/converterall versions9.4.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @dicebear/converter. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @dicebear/converter to 9.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` used a regex-based approach to rewrite SVG `width`/`height` attributes, capping them at 2048px to prevent denial of service. This size capping could be bypassed by crafting SVG input that causes the regex to match a non-functional occurrence of `<svg` before the actual SVG root element. When the SVG is subsequently rendered via `@resvg/resvg-js` on the Node.js code path, it renders at the attacker-specified dimensions, potentially causing out-of-memory crashes. ## Details The vulnerable function used `String.prototype.replace()
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7j2x-32w6-p43p across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.