GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88
HIGHAdmidio allows Unauthenticated Access to Role-Restricted documents via neutralized .htaccess
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Admidio relies on adm_my_files/.htaccess to deny direct HTTP access to uploaded documents. The Docker image ships with AllowOverride None in the Apache configuration, which causes Apache to silently ignore all .htaccess files. As a result, any file uploaded to the
documents module regardless of the role-based permissions configured in the UI, is directly accessible over HTTP without authentication by anyone who knows the file path. The file path is disclosed in the upload response JSON.
Root Cause
File 1: Intended protection (ignored):
adm_my_files/.htaccess
Require all denied
<img width="408" height="403" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/95f0d389-a1a9-4dc4-9840-7f189d2c58ff" />
File 2: Apache config that neutralizes it:
- Command in order to search in Docker container:
docker exec admidio-sec-app cat /etc/apache2/apache2.conf
/etc/apache2/apache2.conf (Docker image)
<Directory ${APACHE_DOCUMENT_ROOT}>
AllowOverride None
</Directory>
<img width="492" height="328" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f2e09b1-0c2e-4932-8698-a40f6b92e917" />
AllowOverride None instructs Apache to skip .htaccess processing entirely, the deny rule never executes. The upload directory is inside the web root at /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files/ and returns HTTP 200 for direct requests.
File 3: Upload response leaks the direct URL: system/file_upload.php, upload response JSON:
{
"files": [{
"name": "sensitive_poc.txt",
"url": "http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt"
}]
}
Verified PoC
Step 1: Admin creates a restricted folder (visible only to Administrator role):
<img width="1161" height="784" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/25d81e44-9a7c-4991-b72e-6e664d176695" />
modules/documents-files.php→ permissions set to roleAdministratoronly.
Step 2: Admin uploads a file to the restricted folder.
Upload response returns:
http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt
<img width="1239" height="294" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84c1bcd1-47d7-4115-ac0f-653b0a6d7301" />
Step 3: Unauthenticated request retrieves the file:
curl -X GET 'http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt'
# Response: full file contents — no authentication required
<img width="1051" height="150" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ed7fab7-59cb-4d5b-8c60-12108490d1e4" />
Step 4: Confirm folder is role-restricted:
SELECT fil_name, fol_name, fol_public FROM adm_files JOIN adm_folders ON fil_fol_id = fol_id
ORDER BY fil_id DESC LIMIT 5; -- fol_public = 0, role restricted — yet file is publicly accessible
Impact
- Any document uploaded to Admidio including files restricted to specific roles is publicly accessible via direct HTTP request with no authentication required
- Role-based access control on the documents module is completely bypassed at the filesystem level
- Sensitive organizational documents (contracts, member data, financial records) are exposed to anyone who can guess or construct the file path
- The upload API response discloses the direct URL to the uploader, making path enumeration trivial
Recommended Fix
Option 1 (preferred): Enable AllowOverride in Apache config:
<Directory /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files>
AllowOverride All
</Directory>
Option 2: Move uploads outside the web root:
Store uploaded files in a directory outside DOCUMENT_ROOT and serve them exclusively through Admidio's download handler (modules/documents-files.php?mode=download), which enforces role checks before serving the file.
Option 3: Apache-level explicit deny (does not require .htaccess):
<Directory /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files>
Require all denied
</Directory>
The most robust long-term fix is Option 2 — moving uploads outside the web root eliminates the dependency on Apache configuration correctness entirely.
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz @JF0x0r
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.0.8 | 5.0.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.