GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-284 vulnerability in admidio/admidio. A fix is available for admidio/admidio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Admidio allows Unauthenticated Access to Role-Restricted documents via neutralized .htaccess
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Admidio relies on adm_my_files/.htaccess to deny direct HTTP access to uploaded documents. The Docker image ships with AllowOverride None in the Apache configuration, which causes Apache to silently ignore all .htaccess files. As a result, any file uploaded to the
documents module regardless of the role-based permissions configured in the UI, is directly accessible over HTTP without authentication by anyone who knows the file path. The file path is disclosed in the upload response JSON.
Root Cause
File 1: Intended protection (ignored):
adm_my_files/.htaccess
Require all denied
File 2: Apache config that neutralizes it:
- Command in order to search in Docker container:
docker exec admidio-sec-app cat /etc/apache2/apache2.conf
/etc/apache2/apache2.conf (Docker image)
<Directory ${APACHE_DOCUMENT_ROOT}>
AllowOverride None
</Directory>
AllowOverride None instructs Apache to skip .htaccess processing entirely, the deny rule never executes. The upload directory is inside the web root at /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files/ and returns HTTP 200 for direct requests.
File 3: Upload response leaks the direct URL: system/file_upload.php, upload response JSON:
{
"files": [{
"name": "sensitive_poc.txt",
"url": "http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt"
}]
}
Verified PoC
Step 1: Admin creates a restricted folder (visible only to Administrator role):
<img width="1161" height="784" alt="imagen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/25d81e44-9a7c-4991-b72e-6e664d176695" />
modules/documents-files.php→ permissions set to roleAdministratoronly.
Step 2: Admin uploads a file to the restricted folder.
Upload response returns:
http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt
Step 3: Unauthenticated request retrieves the file:
curl -X GET 'http://TARGET/adm_my_files/documents_research/TEST-SENSITIVE/sensitive_poc.txt'
# Response: full file contents — no authentication required
Step 4: Confirm folder is role-restricted:
SELECT fil_name, fol_name, fol_public FROM adm_files JOIN adm_folders ON fil_fol_id = fol_id
ORDER BY fil_id DESC LIMIT 5; -- fol_public = 0, role restricted — yet file is publicly accessible
Impact
- Any document uploaded to Admidio including files restricted to specific roles is publicly accessible via direct HTTP request with no authentication required
- Role-based access control on the documents module is completely bypassed at the filesystem level
- Sensitive organizational documents (contracts, member data, financial records) are exposed to anyone who can guess or construct the file path
- The upload API response discloses the direct URL to the uploader, making path enumeration trivial
Recommended Fix
Option 1 (preferred): Enable AllowOverride in Apache config:
<Directory /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files>
AllowOverride All
</Directory>
Option 2: Move uploads outside the web root:
Store uploaded files in a directory outside DOCUMENT_ROOT and serve them exclusively through Admidio's download handler (modules/documents-files.php?mode=download), which enforces role checks before serving the file.
Option 3: Apache-level explicit deny (does not require .htaccess):
<Directory /opt/app-root/src/adm_my_files>
Require all denied
</Directory>
The most robust long-term fix is Option 2 — moving uploads outside the web root eliminates the dependency on Apache configuration correctness entirely.
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz @JF0x0r
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.0.8 | 5.0.8composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-7fh7-8xqm-3g88 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.