GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in @apostrophecms/import-export. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
ApostropheCMS: Arbitrary file read via import-export attachment-name path traversal
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@apostrophecms/import-exportnpmDescription
Summary
The @apostrophecms/import-export module reconstructs the on-disk source path of every imported attachment from JSON metadata contained in the uploaded archive.
The archive carries an aposAttachments.json file whose name and extension fields are concatenated into a filesystem path with no traversal check. The zip-slip guard that the module applies during tar extraction validates tar entry names only and does not cover this second path, which is built after extraction.
The file at the resulting path is read and copied into the public uploads directory, then served over HTTP without authentication. A ../ sequence in name makes the module read a file outside the extraction directory and publish it at an anonymous URL.
Result: an authenticated contributor reads any file on the host whose name ends in an allowlisted extension (other users' uploaded documents, text or CSV dumps, PDFs) by importing a crafted archive and fetching the planted attachment anonymously.
Affected
apostrophecms/apostrophe with the @apostrophecms/import-export module installed and registered. Module version 3.6.1 (current latest), tested against Apostrophe 4.31.0 (monorepo HEAD 4d478d9). Requires an account with the contributor role or higher; guest and anonymous requests are rejected. The module is not part of the default starter kit, so sites that never installed it are not affected. Files whose real name lacks an accepted file-group extension are not reachable.
Root cause
The import parser builds each attachment's source path by concatenating attacker-controlled JSON fields: lib/formats/gzip.js:46 sets file.path = path.join(attachmentFilesPath, ${attachment._id}-${attachment.name}.${attachment.extension}) from the aposAttachments.json entries in the uploaded archive. That path flows unchanged through lib/methods/import.js:832 (insertAttachments) into lib/methods/import.js:1074 (attachment.insert), where uploadfs copies the referenced file into the public uploads directory served by express.static. The archive's only traversal guard, lib/formats/gzip.js:143 (if (name.includes('../'))), validates tar entry names during extraction and never inspects the name/extension values used to construct the read path, so a name of ../../../../../../tmp/secret escapes attachmentFilesPath. Reaching the sink requires only an authenticated session (lib/methods/import.js:71), view permission on the target type (lib/methods/index.js:54), and the upload-attachment permission enforced at modules/@apostrophecms/attachment/index.js:442, which the built-in contributor role holds. The trailing .${extension} is appended and checked against the file-group allowlist in modules/@apostrophecms/attachment/index.js (getFileGroup), so the target file's real name must end in an accepted extension (txt, csv, pdf, xls, doc, svg, and similar).
Reproduction
Apostrophe 4.31.0 starter-kit-essentials, MongoDB, default roles, @apostrophecms/import-export 3.6.1 installed, local uploadfs backend.
- Place a secret file outside the upload tree with an allowlisted extension.
$ cat /tmp/apos_victim_secret.txt
TOP-SECRET DB DUMP
DB_PASSWORD=Pr0d-Secret-9981
API_KEY=sk_live_victim_abcdef
- Build a gzip archive whose
aposAttachments.jsonpoints the attachmentnameat that file through traversal (aposDocs.jsonis[]).
[{"_id":"evilatt0001","name":"../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/apos_victim_secret","extension":"txt","title":"loot","docIds":[],"crops":[]}]
- As a contributor, import the archive through the module's import action (
POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/<type>/import-export-import), then fetch the created attachment with no session.
$ curl -i http://localhost:3500/uploads/attachments/evilatt0001-apos-victim-secret.txt
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
TOP-SECRET DB DUMP
DB_PASSWORD=Pr0d-Secret-9981
API_KEY=sk_live_victim_abcdef
Live-verified: a contributor-driven import reads /tmp/apos_victim_secret.txt (outside the extraction directory) and serves it at an anonymous URL; the same import run as a guest is rejected at the upload-attachment check (modules/@apostrophecms/attachment/index.js:442).
Impact
- Read of arbitrary host files whose real name ends in an allowlisted extension (txt, csv, pdf, xls, doc, svg, and similar).
- Disclosure of other users' uploaded documents and any allowlisted-extension file readable by the Node process.
- The exfiltration target is copied to a public, unauthenticated URL.
- Triggered by the contributor role in a single import, no admin interaction.
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint ([email protected])
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @apostrophecms/import-export | all versions | 3.6.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @apostrophecms/import-export. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @apostrophecms/import-export to 3.6.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-79qf-vqgc-7xx3 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.