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Maven

GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx

MEDIUM

GeoServer Arbitrary file renaming vulnerability in REST Coverage/Data Store API

Also known asCVE-2024-23634
Published
Mar 20, 2024
Updated
Mar 20, 2024
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk48th percentile-0.45%
0.19%0.68%1.16%1.65%0.9%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
org.geoserver:gs-restconfigorg.geoserver:gs-restconfig

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An arbitrary file renaming vulnerability exists that enables an authenticated administrator with permissions to modify stores through the REST Coverage Store or Data Store API to rename arbitrary files and directories with a name that does not end in ".zip".

Details

Store file uploads rename zip files to have a ".zip" extension if it doesn't already have one before unzipping the file. This is fine for file and url upload methods where the files will be in a specific subdirectory of the data directory but, when using the external upload method, this allows arbitrary files and directories to be renamed.

PoC

Coverage Store Example (workspace and store name are irrelevant and any valid coverage format can be used): curl -XPUT -H"Content-Type:application/zip" -u"admin:geoserver" -d"/file/to/move" "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/coveragestores/b/external.geotiff" Data Store Example (workspace and store name and data store format are irrelevant): curl -XPUT -H"Content-Type:application/zip" -u"admin:geoserver" -d"/file/to/move" "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/datastores/b/external.c"

Impact

Renaming GeoServer files will most likely result in a denial of service, either completely preventing GeoServer from running or effectively deleting specific resources (such as a workspace, layer or style). In some cases, renaming GeoServer files could revert to the default settings for that file which could be relatively harmless like removing contact information or have more serious consequences like allowing users to make OGC requests that the customized settings would have prevented them from making. The impact of renaming non-GeoServer files depends on the specific environment although some sort of denial of service is a likely outcome.

References

https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11213 https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/7289

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.geoserver:gs-restconfigall versions2.23.5
Mavenorg.geoserver:gs-restconfig2.24.0&&< 2.24.22.24.2
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.geoserver:gs-restconfig. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.geoserver:gs-restconfig to 2.23.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An arbitrary file renaming vulnerability exists that enables an authenticated administrator with permissions to modify stores through the REST Coverage Store or Data Store API to rename arbitrary files and directories with a name that does not end in ".zip". ### Details Store file uploads rename zip files to have a ".zip" extension if it doesn't already have one before unzipping the file. This is fine for file and url upload methods where the files will be in a specific subdirectory of the data directory but, when using the external upload method, this allows arbitrary files and
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.