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GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7

CRITICAL

n8n has Unauthenticated Expression Evaluation via Form Node

Also known asCVE-2026-27493
Published
Feb 25, 2026
Updated
Feb 28, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk61th percentile+0.81%
0.00%0.52%1.05%1.57%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.3%1.1%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

n8nnpm
85Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

A second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n's Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host.

The vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable:

  1. A form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value.
  2. The field value must begin with an = character, which caused n8n to treat it as an expression and triggered a double-evaluation of the field content. For example, a workflow uses a multi-step Form where a downstream Form node renders user-provided input back in an HTML field and precedes it with an = sign: =<h2>Thank you, {{ $input.first().json[\"Name\"] }}!</h2>

There is no practical reason for a workflow designer to prefix a field with = intentionally — the character is not rendered in the output, so the result would not match the designer's expectations. If added accidentally, it would be noticeable and very unlikely to persist. An unauthenticated attacker would need to either know about this specific circumstance on a target instance or discover a matching form by chance.

Even when the preconditions are met, the expression injection alone is limited to data accessible within the n8n expression context. Escalation to remote code execution requires chaining with a separate sandbox escape vulnerability.

Due to these real-world constraints — the unlikely workflow configuration, the need for an additional sandbox escape, and the difficulty of discovery — we have assessed the severity as High rather than Critical, diverging from the base CVSS score to better reflect actual exploitability.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.10.1, 2.9.3, and 1.123.22. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

  • Review usage of form nodes manually for above mentioned preconditions.
  • Disable the Form node by adding n8n-nodes-base.form to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.
  • Disable the Form Trigger node by adding n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmn8nall versions1.123.22
📦npmn8n2.0.0&&< 2.9.32.9.3
📦npmn8n2.10.0&&< 2.10.12.10.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for n8n. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update n8n to 1.123.22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact A second-order expression injection vulnerability existed in n8n's Form nodes that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary n8n expressions by submitting crafted form data. When chained with an expression sandbox escape, this could escalate to remote code execution on the n8n host. The vulnerability requires a specific workflow configuration to be exploitable: 1. A form node with a field interpolating a value provided by an unauthenticated user, e.g. a form submitted value. 2. The field value must begin with an `=` character, which caused n8n to treat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-75g8-rv7v-32f7 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.