GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-863 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
AVideo has User Group-Based Category Access Control Bypass via Missing and Broken Group Filtering in categories.json.php
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The categories.json.php endpoint, which serves the category listing API, fails to enforce user group-based access controls on categories. In the default request path (no ?user= parameter), user group filtering is entirely skipped, exposing all non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups. When the ?user= parameter is supplied, a type confusion bug causes the filter to use the admin user's (user_id=1) group memberships instead of the current user's, rendering the filter ineffective.
Details
The vulnerability has two related failures in objects/categories.json.php and objects/category.php:
1. Default request — group filtering completely skipped
In categories.json.php:17-24, when $_GET['user'] is not set, $sameUserGroupAsMe defaults to false:
// categories.json.php:17-24
$onlyWithVideos = false;
$sameUserGroupAsMe = false;
if(!empty($_GET['user'])){
$onlyWithVideos = true;
$sameUserGroupAsMe = true;
}
$categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe);
In category.php:438-452, the user group filter is gated on $sameUserGroupAsMe being truthy:
// category.php:438-452
if ($sameUserGroupAsMe) {
$users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe);
$users_groups_id = array(0);
foreach ($users_groups as $value) {
$users_groups_id[] = $value['id'];
}
$sql .= " AND ("
. "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR "
. "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . ")) >= 1 "
. ")";
}
Since $sameUserGroupAsMe = false, the entire block is skipped. All non-private categories are returned regardless of their user group restrictions set via the categories_has_users_groups table.
2. With ?user= parameter — boolean-to-integer type confusion
When $_GET['user'] is non-empty, $sameUserGroupAsMe is set to boolean true (line 21). This value is passed to UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe) at category.php:440.
In userGroups.php:349-379, the parameter is used as $users_id:
// userGroups.php:349,371,379
public static function getUserGroups($users_id){
// ...
$sql = "SELECT uug.*, ug.* FROM users_groups ug"
. " LEFT JOIN users_has_users_groups uug ON users_groups_id = ug.id WHERE users_id = ? ";
// ...
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$users_id]);
PHP casts boolean true to integer 1 for the prepared statement bind, resulting in WHERE users_id = 1 — fetching the admin user's group memberships. The filter then allows categories visible to admin groups, effectively granting any unauthenticated user the admin's category visibility.
3. getTotalCategories also unfiltered
getTotalCategories() at category.php:978 does not accept a $sameUserGroupAsMe parameter at all, so the total count always reflects the unfiltered category set.
The endpoint requires no authentication — it uses allowOrigin() (a CORS header helper) and is publicly routable via the .htaccess rewrite rule: RewriteRule ^categories.json$ objects/categories.json.php.
PoC
# 1. Fetch all categories without authentication — no group filtering applied
curl -s 'https://target/categories.json' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}'
# Returns ALL non-private categories including those restricted to specific user groups.
# The users_groups_ids_array field reveals which groups each category is restricted to.
# Categories with non-empty users_groups_ids_array should be hidden from users not in those groups.
# 2. Attempt the "filtered" path — still broken due to boolean->int cast
curl -s 'https://target/categories.json?user=1' | jq '.rows[] | {id, name, private, users_groups_ids_array}'
# This applies group filtering but uses admin's groups (users_id=1) instead of the
# current user's groups, so group-restricted categories visible to admin are exposed.
Impact
Any unauthenticated user can:
- Enumerate all non-private categories regardless of user group restrictions, bypassing the intended access control model where categories are restricted to specific user groups via the CustomizeUser plugin's
categories_has_users_groupstable. - Discover the user group configuration for each category via the
users_groups_ids_arrayfield in the response, revealing the internal access control structure. - Identify group-restricted content areas that should be hidden, which could be used to target further access control bypasses on the videos within those categories.
The severity is Medium because this is an information disclosure of category metadata (names, descriptions, icons, group assignments) rather than the actual video content within restricted categories. However, the exposure of the access control structure itself (which groups have access to which categories) is a meaningful information leak.
Recommended Fix
In objects/categories.json.php, pass the current user's ID (or 0 for unauthenticated users) instead of a boolean:
// categories.json.php — replace lines 17-24
$onlyWithVideos = false;
$sameUserGroupAsMe = false;
if(!empty($_GET['user'])){
$onlyWithVideos = true;
}
// Always apply user group filtering using the logged-in user's ID
$currentUserId = User::getId();
if (!empty($currentUserId)) {
$sameUserGroupAsMe = $currentUserId;
} else {
// For unauthenticated users, pass a value that will filter to only
// categories with no group restrictions
$sameUserGroupAsMe = -1; // Non-existent user ID, will match no groups
}
$categories = Category::getAllCategories(true, $onlyWithVideos, false, $sameUserGroupAsMe);
Additionally, in category.php:getAllCategories(), ensure the group filter block always runs when categories have group restrictions, not only when $sameUserGroupAsMe is truthy. A more robust approach:
// category.php — replace the sameUserGroupAsMe block (lines 438-452)
// Always filter by user groups if any categories have group restrictions
$users_groups_id = array(0);
if ($sameUserGroupAsMe && $sameUserGroupAsMe > 0) {
$users_groups = UserGroups::getUserGroups($sameUserGroupAsMe);
foreach ($users_groups as $value) {
$users_groups_id[] = $value['id'];
}
}
$sql .= " AND ("
. "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug WHERE c.id = chug.categories_id) = 0 OR "
. "(SELECT count(*) FROM categories_has_users_groups chug2 WHERE c.id = chug2.categories_id AND users_groups_id IN (" . implode(',', $users_groups_id) . ")) >= 1 "
. ")";
This ensures that even when no user is logged in, categories with group restrictions are hidden (only categories with zero group restrictions are shown). The getTotalCategories() function should also be updated to accept and apply the same $sameUserGroupAsMe filter.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-73gr-r64q-7jh4 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.