EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-oReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A flaw introduced in CRI-O version 1.19 which an attacker can use to bypass the safeguards and set arbitrary kernel parameters on the host. As a result, anyone with rights to deploy a pod on a Kubernetes cluster that uses the CRI-O runtime can abuse the kernel.core_pattern kernel parameter to achieve container escape and arbitrary code execution as root on any node in the cluster.
Patches
The patches will be present in 1.19.6, 1.20.7, 1.21.6, 1.22.3, 1.23.2, 1.24.0
Workarounds
- Users can set manage_ns_lifecycle to false, which causes the sysctls to be configured by the OCI runtime, which typically filter these cases. This option is available in 1.20 and 1.19. Newer versions don't have this option.
- An admission webhook could be created to deny pods that specify a
+in the sysctl value of a pod. - A PodSecurityPolicy [deprecated] could be created, specifying all sysctls as forbidden like so:
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: sysctl-psp
spec:
forbiddenSysctls:
- "*"
However, this option will not work if any sysctls are required by any pods in the cluster.
Credits
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to John Walker and Manoj Ahuje of Crowdstrike. The CRI-O community deeply thanks them for the report.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in the CRI-O repo
- To make a report, email your vulnerability to the private [email protected] list with the security details and the details expected for all CRI-O bug reports.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.19.0&&< 1.19.6 | 1.19.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.20.0&&< 1.20.7 | 1.20.7 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.21.0&&< 1.21.6 | 1.21.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.22.0&&< 1.22.3 | 1.22.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.23.0&&< 1.23.2 | 1.23.2 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.19.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6x2m-w449-qwx7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6x2m-w449-qwx7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6x2m-w449-qwx7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6x2m-w449-qwx7 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6x2m-w449-qwx7 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.