Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
.NET
.NET NuGet
CISA KEV · ACTIVELY EXPLOITED
CRITICAL severity

GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in AjaxNetProfessional. It is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-08-26) — treat it as actively exploited and patch now. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Remote Code Execution in AjaxNetProfessional

Also known asCVE-2021-23758SNYK-DOTNET-AJAXPRO2-1925971
Published
Dec 7, 2021
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
3 known
Exploitation data as of Aug 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Actively exploited in the wild

  • Confirmed by CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-08-26. Federal agencies were required to remediate by 2026-09-09.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA (KEV catalog and SSVC triage) for GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
89.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Very High Risk+0.33%
Lower risk than most CVEs100th percentile — riskier than 100% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
81.2%84.4%87.7%90.9%83.0%89.1%Feb 26Jun 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE sits: patch-first territory.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 365,433 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 50–90% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
.NETAjaxNetProfessional

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data due to the possibility of deserialization of arbitrary .NET classes, which can be abused to gain remote code execution.

Description

Serialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the object state in a file or a database). It is an integral part of popular protocols like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Java Management Extension (JMX), Java Messaging System (JMS), Action Message Format (AMF), Java Server Faces (JSF) ViewState, etc.

Deserialization of untrusted data (CWE-502), is when the application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid, letting the attacker to control the state or the flow of the execution.

Java deserialization issues have been known for years. However, interest in the issue intensified greatly in 2015, when classes that could be abused to achieve remote code execution were found in a popular library (Apache Commons Collection). These classes were used in zero-days affecting IBM WebSphere, Oracle WebLogic and many other products.

An attacker just needs to identify a piece of software that has both a vulnerable class on its path, and performs deserialization on untrusted data. Then all they need to do is send the payload into the deserializer, getting the command executed.

Developers put too much trust in Java Object Serialization. Some even de-serialize objects pre-authentication. When deserializing an Object in Java you typically cast it to an expected type, and therefore Java's strict type system will ensure you only get valid object trees. Unfortunately, by the time the type checking happens, platform code has already created and executed significant logic. So, before the final type is checked a lot of code is executed from the readObject() methods of various objects, all of which is out of the developer's control. By combining the readObject() methods of various classes which are available on the classpath of the vulnerable application an attacker can execute functions (including calling Runtime.exec() to execute local OS commands).

Releases

Releases before version 21.11.29.1 are affected. Please be careful to download any binary DLL from other web sites, especially we found NuGet packages not owned by us that contain vulnerable versions.

Workarounds

There is no workaround available that addresses all issues except updating to latest version from GitHub.

References

Find original CVE posting here: https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-DOTNET-AJAXPRO2-1925971

Note: the official Ajax.NET Professional (AjaxPro) NuGet package is available here: https://www.nuget.org/packages/AjaxNetProfessional/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

  • Open an issue on this GitHub repository

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetAjaxNetProfessionalall versions21.11.29.1
Exploits & PoCs
3

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for AjaxNetProfessional. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update AjaxNetProfessional to 21.11.29.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Overview Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data due to the possibility of deserialization of arbitrary .NET classes, which can be abused to gain remote code execution. ### Description Serialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the obj
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw: Remote Code… | O3 Security