GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
New API: SSRF Protection Bypass via Unresolved Hostname in Notification URLs
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 363,829 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/QuantumNous/new-apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The default SSRF protection configuration did not apply IP filtering to hostnames. With ApplyIPFilterForDomain disabled by default, URL validation checked domain allow/block rules but did not resolve a hostname and validate the resolved IP address. Authenticated users could configure notification URLs for Webhook, Bark, or Gotify notifications and point a hostname at an internal or metadata IP address.
Impact
A regular authenticated user could cause the server to send notification requests to internal HTTP services reachable from the deployment network. Depending on the target environment, this could expose sensitive internal data through timing, errors, or response-dependent behavior. The issue is rated High.
Affected versions
Versions before v0.12.0-alpha.1 are affected. The previous affected range of <= v0.11.4-alpha.4 was too narrow because the unsafe default remained present until the v0.12.0-alpha.1 fix.
Patches
This issue is fixed in v0.12.0-alpha.1. The default fetch setting now sets ApplyIPFilterForDomain: true, causing hostname destinations to be resolved and checked against the configured IP filtering rules during URL validation.
This patch addresses the unresolved-hostname bypass for the affected notification URL paths. It does not mark the separate DNS rebinding advisory as fixed, because connection-time IP enforcement is tracked separately.
Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible, explicitly enable ApplyIPFilterForDomain, restrict notification URL domains with an allowlist, disable user-configurable notification URLs where practical, and enforce outbound network filtering at the host or network layer.
Resources
- Fixed by commit
20399d3c8fcb4e3649d53163eb11940fd6763743. - Relevant code paths:
setting/system_setting/fetch_setting.go,common/ssrf_protection.go,service/webhook.go, andservice/user_notify.go.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/QuantumNous/new-api | all versions | 0.12.0-alpha.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.12.0-alpha.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.