How severe is GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f?

GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f has a CVSS score of 6.5/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f?

GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f affects the following packages: Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs (GitHub Actions). Ecosystems affected: GitHub Actions.

How do I fix GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f?

Update Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs to 0.25.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f in my GitHub Actions dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f was published on April 4, 2026 and was last updated on April 4, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f

MEDIUM

actions-mkdocs: Command Injection via issue title in internal GitHub Actions workflow

Published

Apr 4, 2026

Updated

Apr 4, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

📦Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

External input from github.event.issue.title is used unsafely in a shell command in .github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml, allowing command injection during workflow execution.

Details

In .github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml, the issue title is interpolated directly into a shell command:

export VERSION=$(echo ${{ github.event.issue.title }} | sed -E 's/Release v?([0-9\.]*)/\1/g')

Because the issue title is attacker-controlled and is embedded directly into a shell command, shell metacharacters such as command substitution ($()) and command separators (;) can be interpreted by the shell.

Although the workflow checks that the title starts with Release , this condition can still be satisfied by a maliciously crafted input.

PoC

Create or edit an issue with the following title:
```
Release v1.2.3 $(whoami)
```
Trigger the workflow that processes the issue.
Observe that the injected command is executed on the runner.

The workflow logs show that $(whoami) is evaluated and its output (runner) appears in the command result, confirming that attacker-controlled input is executed within the shell.

Impact

This vulnerability allows command injection in the GitHub Actions runner through attacker-controlled issue titles. An attacker may be able to execute arbitrary commands within the context of the affected workflow job.

Depending on the workflow configuration (such as permissions and available secrets), successful exploitation could lead to:

Unauthorized command execution in the CI environment
Misuse of the GITHUB_TOKEN
Modification of repository state, release artifacts, or other workflow outputs

If the repository is public and allows untrusted users to create or reopen issues that trigger the workflow, this may be exploitable by external users.

This issue is limited to the repository's internal workflow configuration and does not directly affect downstream users of the published actions-mkdocs GitHub Action.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦GitHub Actions	`Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs`	all versions	0.25.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Tiryoh/actions-mkdocs to 0.25.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary External input from `github.event.issue.title` is used unsafely in a shell command in `.github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml`, allowing command injection during workflow execution. ### Details In `.github/workflows/release-candidate.yaml`, the issue title is interpolated directly into a shell command: ``` export VERSION=$(echo ${{ github.event.issue.title }} | sed -E 's/Release v?([0-9\.]*)/\1/g') ``` Because the issue title is attacker-controlled and is embedded directly into a shell command, shell metacharacters such as command substitution (`$()`) and command separators

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6p2j-742g-835f across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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