xmldom: HTML raw-text closing-tag case mismatch causes output amplificationGHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw
Fix: xmldom/xmldom#1071GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw is a CWE-178 vulnerability in @xmldom/xmldom. A fix is available for @xmldom/xmldom — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@xmldom/xmldomnpmDescription
Summary
In HTML mode (text/html), a raw-text element (script, style, textarea, title) whose closing
tag differs in case from its opening tag (e.g. </ScRiPt> for <script>) is mishandled by the
parser, producing quadratic (O(n²)) output growth — a small crafted document parses and serializes
into output orders of magnitude larger, exhausting CPU and memory. A modest input of tens of KB can
therefore cause a denial of service in any service that parses untrusted HTML with xmldom. Only HTML
mode is affected.
Details
The parser calls parseHtmlSpecialContent for each raw-text element in HTML mode, matched via
isHTMLRawTextElement / isHTMLEscapableRawTextElement (so all four types — script, style,
textarea, title — are in scope). It searches for the element's closing tag with
source.indexOf('</' + tagName + '>', elStartEnd), a byte-for-byte case-sensitive match. A
mixed-case closing tag never matches, so the search returns -1, and the following
source.substring(elStartEnd + 1, -1) extracts text backwards from the start of the document
instead of the element's content. The function then returns -1 to the parse loop, which cannot
advance normally and falls back to character-by-character reprocessing. Every raw-text element
re-captures all source text preceding it, so output grows as O(n²) in the number of such elements.
Root Cause
- Case-sensitive close-tag search (
lib/sax.js:549):source.indexOf('</' + tagName + '>', elStartEnd)does not fold case, contrary to the WHATWG HTML RAWTEXT end-tag-name rule. - Unguarded
-1(lib/sax.js:550):source.substring(elStartEnd + 1, elEndStart)runs even whenelEndStart === -1, extracting text backwards from position 0. - Unstable progression (
lib/sax.js:556): the function returnselEndStart(-1), driving repeated character-by-character fallback in the parse loop.
Affected Versions
Only the 0.9.x line is affected — the amplification was introduced in 0.9.0-beta.1 when
parseHtmlSpecialContent was refactored, and remains through 0.9.11. The 0.8.x line is not
affected: its older parseHtmlSpecialContent does not amplify, despite sharing the same
case-sensitive indexOf.
Proof of Concept
const { DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const n = 1000;
const payload = '<html><body>' + '<script>x</ScRiPt>'.repeat(n) + '</body></html>';
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(payload, 'text/html');
const out = new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);
console.log(payload.length, out.length, (out.length / payload.length).toFixed(1) + 'x');
// 18026 9037063 501.3x — an 18 KB input yields ~9 MB of output
Output size grows quadratically with the number of case-mismatched raw-text elements:
Repeats | Input len | Output len | Ratio
1 | 44 | 109 | 2.5x
100 | 1826 | 93763 | 51.3x
500 | 9026 | 2268563 | 251.3x
1000 | 18026 | 9037063 | 501.3x
2000 | 36026 | 36074063 | 1001.3x
Proof of Concept from @KarimTantawey (tested with script); the same amplification occurs for style,
textarea, and title.
Impact
Small attacker payloads can force disproportionate CPU and memory usage in services that parse and serialize untrusted HTML via xmldom. The quadratic growth means a modest-sized input (tens of kilobytes) can produce output in the tens or hundreds of megabytes, potentially exhausting memory or causing timeouts.
The attack only requires HTML mode (text/html MIME type) and mixed-case closing tags for
any of the four raw-text element types. No special configuration or error handler setup is needed.
Severity note
The CVSS 4.0 vector scores availability only (VA:H, with VC:N/VI:N): the flaw neither discloses
nor corrupts data, but a small untrusted HTML input (tens of KB) can force output and memory in the
tens to hundreds of MB, enough to exhaust a service's heap or stall its event loop. It is reachable
with no authentication, configuration, or error-handler setup — only that the application parses
untrusted text/html and serializes the result.
Fix Applied
The raw-text closing tag is now matched case-insensitively in HTML raw-text mode (per the WHATWG HTML RAWTEXT end-tag rule), and a missing closing tag is handled explicitly, removing the quadratic output amplification. Output for well-formed input is unchanged. Non-breaking; 0.9.x-only.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @xmldom/xmldom | ≥ 0.9.0-beta.1&&< 0.9.12 | 0.9.12npm install @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.12 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @xmldom/xmldom, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @xmldom/xmldom to 0.9.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
A flaw was found in the xmldom JavaScript package. When parsing HTML documents containing specific mixed-case closing tags for raw-text elements (such as <script>, <style>, <textarea>, or <title>) via DOMParser.parseFromString(), the parseHtmlSpecialContent function miscalculates substring indices due to a…
Pre-sanitize untrusted HTML inputs to normalize raw-text element closing tags to lower case prior to passing them to DOMParser.parseFromString(), or restrict parsing to trusted XML/HTML sources.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
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