Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go

GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847

HIGH

GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) CWE-706 vulnerability in github.com/traefik/traefik/v3. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Traefik has an StripPrefixRegex Middleware Authorization Bypass via Path/RawPath Desync

Also known asCVE-2026-40912GO-2026-5180
Published
Apr 24, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
3 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v3🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v3🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v2🐹github.com/traefik/traefik

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

There is a high severity authentication bypass vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefixRegex middleware when used in combination with ForwardAuth, BasicAuth, or DigestAuth.

The middleware matches the regex against the decoded URL path but uses the resulting byte length to slice the percent-encoded raw path. When a dot (or multiple dots) appears in the prefix portion of the URL, the raw path after stripping becomes a dot-segment (e.g. /./admin/secret).

ForwardAuth receives this dot-segment path in X-Forwarded-Uri, which does not match the protected path patterns and therefore allows the request through. The backend then normalizes the dot-segment to the real path per RFC 3986 and serves the protected content

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this against any backend that performs dot-segment normalization.

Patches

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>

Summary

StripPrefixRegex uses the byte length of a decoded Path match to slice the encoded RawPath. When percent-encoded characters are in the prefix region, this produces a wrong RawPath. ForwardAuth then receives this wrong path in X-Forwarded-Uri, sees a path that doesn't match its protection rules, and approves the request. The backend serves protected content.

Details

pkg/middlewares/stripprefixregex/strip_prefix_regex.go, line 62:

req.URL.RawPath = ensureLeadingSlash(req.URL.RawPath[len(prefix):])

prefix comes from matching the regex against the decoded req.URL.Path (line 51). len(prefix) is then used to index into the encoded req.URL.RawPath. These lengths don't match when percent-encoding is present.

Example with regex ^/api:

  • GET /api%20/admin/secret
  • Decoded Path: /api /admin/secret -> prefix = /api (4 bytes)
  • Encoded RawPath: /api%20/admin/secret -> same region is 6 bytes
  • RawPath[4:] = %20/admin/secret -> after ensureLeadingSlash -> /%20/admin/secret
  • ForwardAuth sees X-Forwarded-Uri: /%20/admin/secret -> not /admin/* -> allows it
  • Backend serves the protected admin content

PoC

Requires Docker and Docker Compose. I have a setup that runs Traefik v3.6.11 with StripPrefixRegex + ForwardAuth + a backend. It sends a normal request (blocked, 403) and an encoded request (bypasses auth, 200, returns protected data). Can share the files here if useful.

Impact

Auth bypass. Any path protected by ForwardAuth, BasicAuth, or DigestAuth can be accessed without credentials when StripPrefixRegex is in the same middleware chain. The attacker only needs to add a percent-encoded character to the prefix portion of the URL.


Updated PoC (reporter follow-up)

After further testing, the confirmed working exploit uses %2e (percent-encoded dot) rather than %20. Dot-segment normalization (/./ -> /) is RFC 3986 standard behavior handled automatically by Express.js, Go's http.ServeMux, Spring Boot, and others — no custom configuration needed.

Chain:

GET /api%2e/admin/secret
-> StripPrefixRegex strips /api -> RawPath becomes /./admin/secret
-> ForwardAuth sees /./admin/secret -> does not match /admin/ -> allows
-> Express normalizes /./admin/secret -> /admin/secret -> serves protected content

Results (Traefik v3.6, unmodified Express.js express.static):

GET /api/admin/secret      -> 403 (blocked)
GET /api%2e/admin/secret   -> 200 (bypass — served protected content)
GET /api%20/admin/secret   -> 404 (space not normalized by backend)

Auth server logs:

X-Forwarded-Uri: '/admin/secret'    -> DENIED
X-Forwarded-Uri: '/./admin/secret'  -> ALLOWED

Reproduction:

docker compose up -d --build --wait
curl http://localhost:8080/api/admin/secret                       # -> 403
curl --path-as-is "http://localhost:8080/api%2e/admin/secret"     # -> 200
</details>

Affected Packages

4 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v33.7.0-ea.1&&< 3.7.0-rc.23.7.0-rc.2
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v33.0.0-beta1&&< 3.6.143.6.14
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v2all versions2.11.43
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefikall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.7.0-rc.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary There is a high severity authentication bypass vulnerability in Traefik's `StripPrefixRegex` middleware when used in combination with `ForwardAuth`, `BasicAuth`, or `DigestAuth`. The middleware matches the regex against the decoded URL path but uses the resulting byte length to slice the percent-encoded raw path. When a dot (or multiple dots) appears in the prefix portion of the URL, the raw path after stripping becomes a dot-segment (e.g. `/./admin/secret`). `ForwardAuth` receives this dot-segment path in `X-Forwarded-Uri`, which does not match the protected path patterns and th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6jwx-7vp4-9847 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.