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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m

LOW

python-multipart: Semicolon treated as querystring field separator enables parameter smuggling

Also known asCVE-2026-53538PYSEC-2026-3037
Published
Jun 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍python-multipart

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

QuerystringParser treated ; as a field separator in application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, in addition to &. The WHATWG URL standard, modern browsers, and Python's urllib.parse (since the CVE-2021-23336 fix) treat only & as a separator. This creates a parser differential: the same bytes are tokenized into different fields than a WHATWG compliant intermediary would produce, allowing an attacker to smuggle extra form fields past an upstream body inspecting component.

Details

In python_multipart/multipart.py, the FIELD_NAME and FIELD_DATA states located the next separator by scanning for & and, failing that, for ;:

sep_pos = data.find(b"&", i)
if sep_pos == -1:
    sep_pos = data.find(b";", i)

As a result, ; acted as a field boundary. Because the fallback only triggered when no & remained in the current chunk, tokenization also depended on unrelated bytes later in the buffer and on how the body was split across write() calls. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2021-23336 in CPython's urllib.parse.

For example, a body inspecting WAF or gateway that follows the WHATWG rule (only & separates fields) receives:

role=user&x=;role=admin

The upstream parses two fields, role=user and x=";role=admin", sees a benign role=user, and forwards the request. QuerystringParser parsed the same bytes as three fields: role="user", x="", and role="admin". The application (for example via Starlette/FastAPI request.form(), where the last value wins) then received role=admin, a value the upstream validator never saw.

The parser is reachable through the public QuerystringParser class, the high level FormParser, create_form_parser, and parse_form APIs, and Starlette/FastAPI request.form() for url encoded bodies.

Impact

Interpretation conflict / HTTP parameter pollution. An attacker can smuggle extra or overriding form fields past an upstream component that applies the WHATWG separator rule, reaching the backend with parameters the intermediary did not observe.

Mitigation

Upgrade to python-multipart 0.0.30 or later, which treats only & as a field separator per the WHATWG URL standard. ; is parsed as ordinary field data, matching urllib.parse, browsers, and other compliant parsers.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpython-multipartall versions0.0.30

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for python-multipart. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update python-multipart to 0.0.30 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `QuerystringParser` treated `;` as a field separator in `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, in addition to `&`. The [WHATWG URL standard](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#urlencoded-parsing), modern browsers, and Python's `urllib.parse` (since the CVE-2021-23336 fix) treat only `&` as a separator. This creates a parser differential: the same bytes are tokenized into different fields than a WHATWG compliant intermediary would produce, allowing an attacker to smuggle extra form fields past an upstream body inspecting component. ### Details In `python_multipart/multipart.py`, t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6jv3-5f52-599m across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.