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Not in CISA KEV
LOW severity

GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3

LOWFix: ondata/ckan-mcp-server@3b827af

GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-209 vulnerability in @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

CKAN MCP Server: Information disclosure via verbose error reflection

Also known asCVE-2026-73844
Published
Sep 3, 2026
Updated
Sep 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@aborruso/ckan-mcp-servernpm
414downloads / week

Description

Summary

Error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF'd to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments).

Affected code

src/utils/http.ts — the entire decoded upstream body is embedded in the thrown error, which formatCkanError returns to the tool result:

} else {
  throw new CkanApiError(
    `CKAN API returned success=false: ${JSON.stringify(decodedData)}`,   // full body reflected
    undefined,
    action
  );
}

src/worker.ts — the catch-all handler returns the raw Error.message in the JSON-RPC data field:

return new Response(JSON.stringify({
  jsonrpc: '2.0',
  error: { code: -32603, message: 'Internal error',
           data: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) },  // raw internal message
  id: null
}), { status: 500, ... });

Impact

  • Reflects arbitrary upstream response content to the caller. Combined with the SSRF vectors (advisories #01/#06), an attacker can use this as the read channel: point the server at an internal endpoint and receive its body inside the success=false error string (turning otherwise-blind SSRF into a semi-blind/return-value SSRF for any host that reaches the guards).
  • Leaks internal operational detail via exception messages: node error codes and target addresses (e.g. ECONNREFUSED 169.254.169.254:80), which confirm internal reachability and infrastructure, and any stack/path fragments an upstream includes.
  • Aids reconnaissance and error-oracle attacks against the deployment.

Severity is Low on its own (the server holds no credentials of its own and sends no auth upstream), but it meaningfully amplifies the SSRF findings by providing a response-content channel.

Proof of concept

poc/error-disclosure-poc.mjs reproduces both paths and shows an upstream body (containing a simulated DB error with an internal IP) and an internal ECONNREFUSED 169.254.169.254 message being reflected to the caller.

Remediation

  • Return generic, action-scoped error messages to the caller; log the detailed upstream body/exception server-side only.
  • Do not embed JSON.stringify(decodedData) in caller-visible errors; cap and redact any reflected content.
  • In the Workers catch-all, omit error.message from the response data (or replace with a correlation id) in production.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@aborruso/ckan-mcp-serverall versions0.4.112

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server to 0.4.112 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF'd to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments). ## Affected code `src/utils/http.ts` — the entire decoded upstream body is embedded in the thrown error, which `formatCkanError` returns to the tool result: ```js } else { throw new Ckan
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-s… | O3 Security