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📦 npm

GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw

MEDIUM

iOS Simulator MCP Command Injection allowed via exec API

Also known asCVE-2025-52573
Published
Jun 26, 2025
Updated
Jun 26, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk47th percentile+0.64%
0.00%0.39%0.77%1.16%0.0%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

ios-simulator-mcpnpm
5Kdownloads / week

Description

Command Injection in MCP Server

The MCP Server at https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/ is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation.

Vulnerable tool

The MCP Server exposes the tool ui_tap which relies on Node.js child process API exec which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input.

LLM exposed user input for duration, udid, and x and y args can be replaced with shell meta-characters like ; or && or others to change the behavior from running the expected command idb to another command.

Vulnerable line of code: https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/blob/main/src/index.ts#L166-L207

  server.tool(
    "ui_tap",
    "Tap on the screen in the iOS Simulator",
    {
      duration: z.string().optional().describe("Press duration"),
      udid: z
        .string()
        .optional()
        .describe("Udid of target, can also be set with the IDB_UDID env var"),
      x: z.number().describe("The x-coordinate"),
      y: z.number().describe("The x-coordinate"),
    },
    async ({ duration, udid, x, y }) => {
      try {
        const actualUdid = await getBootedDeviceId(udid);
        const durationArg = duration ? `--duration ${duration}` : "";
        const { stderr } = await execAsync(
          `idb ui tap --udid ${actualUdid} ${durationArg} ${x} ${y}  --json`
        );

Exploitation

When LLMs are tricked through prompt injection (and other techniques and attack vectors) to call the tool with input that uses special shell characters such as ; rm -rf /tmp;# and other payload variations, the full command-line text will be interepted by the shell and result in other commands except of ps executing on the host running the MCP Server.

Reference example from prior security research on this topic:

Cursor defined MCP Server vulnerable to command injection

Impact

User initiated and remote command injection on a running MCP Server.

References and Prior work

  1. Exploiting MCP Servers Vulnerable to Command Injection
  2. Liran's Node.js Secure Coding: Defending Against Command Injection Vulnerabilities

Disclosed by Liran Tal

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmios-simulator-mcpall versions1.3.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ios-simulator-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update ios-simulator-mcp to 1.3.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Command Injection in MCP Server The MCP Server at https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/ is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation. ## Vulnerable tool The MCP Server exposes the tool `ui_tap` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input. LLM exposed user input for `duration`, `udid`, and `x` and `y` args can be replaced with shell meta-characters like `;` or `&&` or others to change the b
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.