GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel. A fix is available for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SiYuan: Full-content disclosure of publish-disabled documents via getHeading*Transaction endpoints (publish mode): reader-reachable rendered DOM with no publish-access check
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-68587.
Summary
Three "heading transaction" endpoints /api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction, /api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction, and /api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction return the rendered block DOM of a heading and its subtree in the computed transaction payload, with no publish-access check. They are gated by CheckAuth only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Despite their write-implying names, these endpoints perform no mutation on this path, they compute a transaction object and return it, and that object contains RenderNodeBlockDOM output. As a result, an anonymous reader who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a document that has been explicitly marked publish-disabled by an administrator, content that the reader-facing /api/filetree/getDoc path correctly refuses to return.
Details
Route / auth tier. All three routes are registered CheckAuth-only (no CheckAdminRole). CheckAuth admits RoleReader, and the publish proxy forwards port-6808 traffic with a Reader JWT (anonymous account when publish auth is disabled). Anonymous/reader reachable.
No publish-access filter. GetHeadingDeleteTransaction / GetHeadingLevelTransaction / GetHeadingInsertTransaction load the heading's block tree and render its DOM into the returned transaction's operation data. None of the three invokes IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter that the reader-safe content path (getDoc) applies. The reader-facing content endpoints (getDoc, and the CheckAdminRole-gated getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown) treat rendered block DOM as gated content; these three transaction endpoints return the same rendered DOM without that gate.
Write-implying name, read behavior. On this code path the endpoints only compute the transaction (e.g. the undoOperations a delete would produce) and return it; nothing is deleted or modified. The returned operation data includes the rendered HTML of the heading subtree. This mismatch, mutation-shaped name, content-returning behavior is why the gap is easy to miss.
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). DOC is a document containing a heading HEADING whose body contains the unique marker UNIQUE_MARKER_99, and DOC is marked publish-disabled by the administrator.
1. Confirm the document is publish-disabled (admin action, the boundary that should block reads):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess
Authorization: Token <admin-token>
{"id":"DOC","visible":false,"password":"","disable":true}
2. Baseline: the reader-safe content path correctly blocks it (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc
{"id":"DOC"}
Returns the blocked/placeholder response, the publish filter is applied, no content.
3. Disclosure: the transaction endpoint returns the content (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingDeleteTransaction
{"id":"HEADING"}
Returns HTTP 200; data.undoOperations[].data contains the rendered HTML of the heading subtree, including the hidden body text UNIQUE_MARKER_99. Nothing is deleted — the endpoint only computes the transaction. This is the full content of a publish-disabled document returned to an anonymous reader.
4. Sibling endpoints: same disclosure, same input:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingLevelTransaction
{"id":"HEADING","level":2}
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingInsertTransaction
{"id":"HEADING"}
Both return the rendered DOM of the heading subtree in their operation data.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader who supplies a heading block ID can read the full rendered content of a publish-disabled document, defeating a boundary the administrator explicitly configured.
Precondition: the request requires the target heading's block ID. Block IDs are high-entropy and are not returned by this endpoint, so this endpoint alone does not permit untargeted enumeration of arbitrary documents. However, block/heading IDs for publish-disabled documents are obtainable from other CheckAuth-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (the publish-boundary handler set reported separately, e.g. getHeadingChildrenIDs). Chained with such an ID source, this yields end-to-end unauthenticated full-content disclosure of publish-disabled documents. Presented standalone, the attacker must already possess the heading ID.
Impact is confidentiality-only: these endpoints return content but do not (on this path) modify data. No admin role, CSRF token, or write permission is required. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check the content path uses IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter used by getDoc to all three getHeading*Transaction handlers, or gate them behind CheckAdminRole consistent with getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown. Any endpoint that returns rendered block DOM should enforce the same publish boundary as the primary content path.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | all versions | 0.0.0-20260721013353-69db783b782ago get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260721013353-69db783b782a |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 0.0.0-20260721013353-69db783b782a or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-69mh-gvh4-8gp7 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.