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GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9

MEDIUM

File Browser has an Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow

Also known asCVE-2026-32761GO-2026-4738
Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Apr 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk34th percentile+0.41%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.92%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A permission enforcement flaw allows users without download privileges (download=false) to still expose and retrieve file content via public share links when they retain share privileges (share=true). This bypasses intended access control policy and enables unauthorized data exfiltration to unauthenticated users. Where download restrictions are used for data-loss prevention or role separation.

Details

The backend applies inconsistent authorization checks across download paths:

  • Direct raw download correctly enforces Perm.Download:
    • [raw.go](filebrowser/http/raw.go:82)
  • Share creation only enforces Perm.Share:
    • [share.go](filebrowser/http/share.go:21)
  • Public share/download handlers serve shared content without verifying owner Perm.Download:

As a result, a user who is blocked from direct downloads can create a share and obtain the same file via /api/public/dl/<hash>.

PoC

  1. Create a non-admin user with:
  • perm.share = true
  • perm.download = false
  1. Login as that user and upload a PDF file:
  • POST /api/resources/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf with Content-Type: application/pdf
  1. Verify direct raw download is denied:
  • GET /api/raw/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf
  • Expected and observed: 202 Accepted (blocked)
  1. Create share for same file:
  • POST /api/share/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf
  • Observed: 200, response includes hash (example: qxfK3JMG)
  1. Download publicly without authentication:
  • GET /api/public/dl/<hash>
  • Observed (vulnerable): 200, Content-Type: application/pdf, and PDF bytes are returned

Live evidence captured (March 1, 2026):

  • create user: 201
  • create file: 200
  • direct /api/raw: 202 Accepted
  • create share: 200
  • public download /api/public/dl/mxK-ppZb: 200
  • public download content-type: application/pdf
  • public download body length: 327 bytes

Impact

This is an access control / authorization policy bypass vulnerability.

  • Who can exploit: Any authenticated user granted share=true but denied download.
  • Who is impacted: Operators and organizations relying on download restrictions to prevent data export.
  • What can happen: Restricted users can still distribute and retrieve files publicly, including unauthenticated access through share URLs.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gohttps://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowserall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser has shipped for GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-68j5-4m99-w9w9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A permission enforcement flaw allows users without download privileges (`download=false`) to still expose and retrieve file content via public share links when they retain share privileges (`share=true`). This bypasses intended access control policy and enables unauthorized data exfiltration to unauthenticated users. Where download restrictions are used for data-loss prevention or role separation. ### Details The backend applies inconsistent authorization checks across download paths: - Direct raw download correctly enforces `Perm.Download`: - [[raw.go](https://github.com/fileb
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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