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HIGH severity

TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypassGHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6

HIGHFix: nilsteampassnet/TeamPass@e022b27

GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) CWE-639 vulnerability in nilsteampassnet/TeamPass. A fix is available for nilsteampassnet/TeamPass — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-103035
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘nilsteampassnet/TeamPass

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Missing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6.

The defect

The folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the caller's accessible-folder set, and the file itself performs no session/authorization gate at all. By pointing the new parent at their own personal folder, an authenticated low-privilege user takes ownership of any folder in the instance.

app/sources/folders.queries.php:

  • The file never calls the session/authorization helpers: a grep for checkSession and userAccessPage across the whole file returns zero hits.
  • case 'update_folder' (lines 294-662) contains no reference to the caller's user-accessible_folders set. The only access-related logic is the personal-folder computation at lines 428-468 and the guard at line 503, which short-circuits on (int) $isPersonal === 1.
  • The sibling actions do carry the check: case 'add_folder' validates against user-accessible_folders at line 743, case 'delete_folders' at line 904, and case 'copy_folder' applies the equivalent parent check.

So update_folder is the one folder-mutating action in the file without an authorization predicate on either the target folder id or the new parent id.

Attacker model and trace

An authenticated TeamPass user who is not read-only (no administrative role required). The attacker submits update_folder with the victim folder's id and a parentId pointing at their own personal folder. Because the new parent is personal, the personal-folder computation sets $isPersonal = 1, which satisfies the line 503 guard, and the update writes the new parent and personal_folder = 1 for the target folder.

Consequences: the stolen subtree is added to the attacker's accessible set on their next login, so the item list renders for them, and do_items_list_in_folder exposes the plaintext label, login, url, email and description of every credential in that subtree (item passwords stay sharekey-protected, hence C:L). Because the folder is now flagged personal, it disappears from the organization view for everyone else including administrators (the admin listing selects only personal_folder = 0), so this is also a denial of access to the real owners.

Verification

Source-verified at HEAD: no session/authorization helper anywhere in the file; the update_folder case contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder, delete_folders and copy_folder do; the personal-folder short-circuit at line 503. A live TeamPass instance was not stood up.

Secondary (needs a live confirmation before filing): there appears to be an unauthenticated variant. filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'key') returns null when omitted and $session->get('key') is null on a cookie-less session, so the null !== null comparison fails open; encryptClientServer is only set in public/index.php, so prepareExchangedData takes the plaintext-JSON branch. If that holds on a live instance this rises toward 9.4. The sibling actions fail closed on the anonymous path; only update_folder fails open. Please verify live, or report the authenticated variant alone (which stands on the source reading).

Suggested fix

In the update_folder case, verify that both the target folder id and the submitted parentId are members of the caller's user-accessible_folders set (mirroring add_folder and delete_folders) before applying the update, and reject a re-parent that would flip personal_folder for a folder the caller does not own. Adding the standard session/authorization gate to folders.queries.php as a whole is the more durable fix. Note items.queries.php has a second, identically named update_folder case that does perform the accessible-folders check, but that one can only edit title/complexity; the unguarded copy in folders.queries.php is the one the UI calls for re-parenting.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating, but it was confirmed at HEAD that folders.queries.php contains no checkSession/userAccessPage call, that the update_folder case (lines 294-662) contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder (line 743) and delete_folders (line 904) do, and that the personal-folder short-circuit sits at line 503.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistnilsteampassnet/TeamPassall versions3.2.2.0composer require nilsteampassnet/TeamPass:^3.2.2.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nilsteampassnet/TeamPass, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update nilsteampassnet/TeamPass to 3.2.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Missing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6. ## The defect The folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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