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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg

MEDIUM

GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Missing Authentication vulnerability in open-webui. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Open WebUI Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RAG Configuration Disclosure

Also known asCVE-2026-45397PYSEC-2026-2706
Published
May 14, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs52th percentile — riskier than 52% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.42%0.83%1.25%0.0%0.7%0.8%0.8%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 358,265 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍open-webui

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Vulnerability Type: Information Disclosure / Missing Authentication
Severity: Medium
Component: backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.pyget_status() (GET /)
Affected Endpoint: GET /api/v1/retrieval/
Affected Version: Open WebUI main branch — confirmed unpatched through v0.9.2
Authentication Required: None — internet-facing with zero credentials
CVSSv3.1 Score: 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)


Summary

GET /api/v1/retrieval/ returns live RAG pipeline configuration to any unauthenticated HTTP client. No Authorization header, cookie, or API key is required. Every adjacent endpoint on the same router (/embedding, /config) is correctly guarded by get_admin_user making this a targeted omission.


Root Cause

backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py:262

@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request):   # ← no Depends(get_verified_user)
    return {
        'status': True,
        'CHUNK_SIZE': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_SIZE,
        'CHUNK_OVERLAP': request.app.state.config.CHUNK_OVERLAP,
        'RAG_TEMPLATE': request.app.state.config.RAG_TEMPLATE,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL,
        'RAG_RERANKING_MODEL': request.app.state.config.RAG_RERANKING_MODEL,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE,
        'ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING': request.app.state.config.ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING,
        'RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS': request.app.state.config.RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS,
    }

Compare with every adjacent endpoint on the same router:

@router.get('/embedding')
async def get_embedding_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):  # ✅

@router.get('/config')
async def get_rag_config(request: Request, user=Depends(get_admin_user)):        # ✅

Proof Of Concept — No Token Required

curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/retrieval/
{
  "status": true,
  "CHUNK_SIZE": 1000,
  "CHUNK_OVERLAP": 100,
  "RAG_TEMPLATE": "### Task:\nRespond to the user query using the provided context...\n<context>\n{{CONTEXT}}\n</context>",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINE": "",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL": "sentence-transformers/all-MiniLM-L6-v2",
  "RAG_RERANKING_MODEL": "",
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE": 1,
  "ENABLE_ASYNC_EMBEDDING": true,
  "RAG_EMBEDDING_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS": 0
}

Disclosed Information and Its Value to an Attacker

FieldWhat it reveals
RAG_EMBEDDING_ENGINEBackend type (OpenAI, Ollama, Azure, etc.)
RAG_EMBEDDING_MODELExact model name — reveals embedding model
RAG_RERANKING_MODELReranker in use — reveals reranker
RAG_TEMPLATERAG template — exposes the RAG template
CHUNK_SIZE / CHUNK_OVERLAPChunking parameters — enables exact reconstruction of how documents are split and retrieved

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker sends one unauthenticated HTTP GET to /api/v1/retrieval/.
  2. Response reveals the embedding model and chunking parameters.
  3. Attacker uses the exact chunk size/overlap to craft RAG poisoning payloads that are guaranteed to be retrieved.

Impact

  1. RAG template disclosure
  2. Infrastructure fingerprinting — embedding engine and model name reveal the AI stack to an internet scanner
  3. RAG attack surface mapping — chunk parameters enable precise calculation of retrieval boundaries
  4. Zero-effort recon — no brute force, no credentials, no rate-limit concern. Single request from any IP.

Recommended Fix

Add get_verified_user dependency (or get_admin_user for stricter control):

# BEFORE (vulnerable)
@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request):


# AFTER
@router.get('/')
async def get_status(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopen-webuiall versions0.9.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update open-webui to 0.9.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Vulnerability Type:** Information Disclosure / Missing Authentication **Severity:** Medium **Component:** `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py` — `get_status()` (`GET /`) **Affected Endpoint:** `GET /api/v1/retrieval/` **Affected Version:** Open WebUI `main` branch — confirmed unpatched through **v0.9.2** **Authentication Required:** None — internet-facing with zero credentials **CVSSv3.1 Score:** 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) --- ## Summary `GET /api/v1/retrieval/` returns live RAG pipeline configuration to any unauthenticated HTTP client. No `Authorization` h
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-65pg-qhhw-mxwg across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.