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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4

MEDIUM

OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Also known asCVE-2023-23940PYSEC-2023-39
Published
Feb 2, 2023
Updated
Feb 22, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk12th percentile+0.16%
0.00%0.24%0.48%0.72%0.0%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍openzeppelin-cairo-contracts

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Cause

is_valid_eth_signature is missing a call to finalize_keccak after calling verify_eth_signature.

Impact

As a result, any contract using is_valid_eth_signature from the account library (such as the EthAccount preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.

Risk

In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.

Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.

Patches

The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenzeppelin-cairo-contracts0.2.0&&< 0.6.10.6.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openzeppelin-cairo-contracts. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openzeppelin-cairo-contracts to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Cause `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. ### Impact As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. ### Risk In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.