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GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962

AVideo has Unauthenticated PGP Message Decryption via Public Endpoint

Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Mar 19, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

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Description

Summary

The AVideo platform exposes a publicly accessible endpoint that performs server-side PGP decryption without requiring any form of authentication. Any anonymous user can submit a private key, ciphertext, and passphrase to the endpoint and receive the decrypted plaintext in the JSON response. This functionality is entirely unprotected, meaning no session, token, or credential is needed to invoke it.

Details

The endpoint at decryptMessage.json.php accepts a JSON body containing three user-supplied fields: a private key, an encrypted message, and a key password. The server passes these directly into a decryption routine and returns the result. There is no call to any authentication or session validation function before this operation is performed. The relevant server-side operation is:

$textDecrypted = decryptMessage($obj->textToDecrypt, $obj->privateKeyToDecryptMsg, $obj->keyPassword);

Because no access control exists, any unauthenticated request that reaches this endpoint will be processed. The primary concerns are exposure of private key material to server memory and logging infrastructure, and unconstrained consumption of server CPU resources for cryptographic operations. An attacker who has obtained a private key and matching ciphertext through other means can offload decryption work to the target server without holding any account on the platform.

PoC

curl -s -X POST \
  "https://target.example.com/plugin/LoginControl/pgp/decryptMessage.json.php" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "textToDecrypt": "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----\n<base64_ciphertext>\n-----END PGP MESSAGE-----",
    "privateKeyToDecryptMsg": "-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\n<base64_private_key>\n-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----",
    "keyPassword": "passphrase"
  }'

Impact

Private key material submitted to this endpoint is processed in server memory and may be captured in application logs, web server access logs, or error logs depending on server configuration. This can result in unintended disclosure of sensitive key material to administrators or anyone with log access. Additionally, the lack of any rate limiting combined with the absence of authentication allows any external party to submit large volumes of decryption requests, consuming server CPU resources without restriction. Any user who can reach the endpoint network-layer can trigger these effects.

Mitigation

A User::isLogged() check, or an equivalent session and authentication validation step, should be added at the top of decryptMessage.json.php before any user-supplied input is processed. Decryption operations should only be permitted for authenticated and authorized users. Server logging configuration should also be reviewed to ensure that POST body contents, including key material, are not written to persistent logs.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The AVideo platform exposes a publicly accessible endpoint that performs server-side PGP decryption without requiring any form of authentication. Any anonymous user can submit a private key, ciphertext, and passphrase to the endpoint and receive the decrypted plaintext in the JSON response. This functionality is entirely unprotected, meaning no session, token, or credential is needed to invoke it. ### Details The endpoint at decryptMessage.json.php accepts a JSON body containing three user-supplied fields: a private key, an encrypted message, and a key password. The server passe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5x2w-37xf-7962 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.