GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m
GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m is a CWE-284 vulnerability in flowise. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
flowisenpmDescription
Summary
A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI.
The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object.
Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings.
Details
The endpoint responsible for updating chatflows:
PUT /api/v1/chatflows/{chatflowId}
accepts a JSON request body containing the chatflow configuration (flowData) along with other metadata fields.
However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.
Examples of server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:
- deployed
- isPublic
- workspaceId
- createdDate
- updatedDate
- category
- type
These fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity when processing the update request, suggesting that the server performs a direct merge of the request body into the chatflow model without applying a strict DTO whitelist or authorization checks.
For example, modifying the request body with:
{
"deployed": true,
"isPublic": true,
"createdDate": "1999-03-06T10:59:32.000Z",
"updatedDate": "1999-03-06T13:21:34.000Z",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
results in the server accepting and persisting these values.
In testing, a second workspace was created in the database and the workspaceId field was successfully modified through the API request. The chatflow was reassigned to the attacker-controlled workspace, confirming that the application does not enforce workspace ownership validation.
PoC
Authenticate to the Flowise interface.
Capture the request used to update a chatflow:
PUT /api/v1/chatflows/<CHATFLOW_ID>
Content-Type: application/json
Modify the request body by injecting additional fields:
{
"name": "test-flow",
"flowData": "{...}",
"deployed": true,
"isPublic": true,
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
Send the request.
Observe that the response returns the manipulated values:
{
"deployed": true,
"isPublic": true,
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
Verify in the database that the chatflow has been reassigned:
SELECT id, workspaceId FROM chat_flow WHERE id='<CHATFLOW_ID>';
The workspaceId value reflects the attacker-supplied workspace.
Impact
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate server-controlled attributes of chatflows.
Confirmed impacts include:
- Unauthorized modification of chatflow visibility (isPublic)
- Unauthorized deployment state changes (deployed)
- Cross-workspace reassignment of chatflows (workspaceId)
- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)
In multi-tenant environments, this allows an attacker to move chatflows between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.
This may enable:
- Cross-workspace workflow takeover
- Unauthorized exposure of private workflows
- Manipulation of deployed agent workflows
The issue stems from missing authorization checks and improper handling of client-controlled input in the chatflow update endpoint.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.1.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.