GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7
Fix: filebrowser/filebrowser@0231b7eGHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 is a CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.
Details
resourceDeleteHandler in http/resource.go cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:
// http/resource.go
err = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)
file.Path here is the logical path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. /a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:
// storage/bolt/share.go
func (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {
var links []share.Link
if err := s.db.Prefix("Path", pathPrefix, &links); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, link := range links {
err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(&share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))
}
return err
}
Why the design contradicts this behavior. share.Link carries a UserID field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. shareDeleteHandler explicitly enforces link.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.
Impact
- Integrity: unauthorized deletion of share-link metadata belonging to arbitrary users, including administrators.
- Availability: effective denial-of-service of the share-link feature — a cooperating (or malicious) low-priv user can wipe the bulk of existing share links by iterating a short set of one- and two-character prefixes.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.63.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
No patched version of github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser has shipped for GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.