GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8
MEDIUMImageMagick has a NULL pointer dereference in MSL parser via <comment> tag before image load
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Magick.NET-Q8-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-x86.NETMagick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-x86+11 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
NULL pointer dereference in MSL (Magick Scripting Language) parser when processing <comment> tag before any image is loaded.
Version
- ImageMagick 7.x (tested on current main branch)
- Commit: HEAD
Steps to Reproduce
Method 1: Using ImageMagick directly
magick MSL:poc.msl out.png
Method 2: Using OSS-Fuzz reproduce
python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers imagemagick
python3 infra/helper.py reproduce imagemagick msl_fuzzer poc.msl
Or run the fuzzer directly:
./msl_fuzzer poc.msl
Expected Behavior
ImageMagick should handle the malformed MSL gracefully and return an error message.
Actual Behavior
convert: MagickCore/property.c:297: MagickBooleanType DeleteImageProperty(Image *, const char *): Assertion `image != (Image *) NULL' failed.
Aborted
Root Cause Analysis
In coders/msl.c:7091, MSLEndElement() calls DeleteImageProperty() on msl_info->image[n] when handling the </comment> end tag without checking if the image is NULL:
if (LocaleCompare((const char *) tag,"comment") == 0 )
{
(void) DeleteImageProperty(msl_info->image[n],"comment"); // No NULL check
...
}
When <comment> appears before any <read> operation, msl_info->image[n] is NULL, causing the assertion failure in DeleteImageProperty() at property.c:297.
Impact
- DoS: Crash via assertion failure (debug builds) or NULL pointer dereference (release builds)
- Affected: Any application using ImageMagick to process user-supplied MSL files
Fuzzer
This issue was discovered using a custom MSL fuzzer:
#include <cstdint>
#include <Magick++/Blob.h>
#include <Magick++/Image.h>
#include "utils.cc"
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size)
{
if (IsInvalidSize(Size))
return(0);
try
{
const Magick::Blob blob(Data, Size);
Magick::Image image;
image.magick("MSL");
image.fileName("MSL:");
image.read(blob);
}
catch (Magick::Exception)
{
}
return(0);
}
This issue was found by Team FuzzingBrain @ Texas A&M University
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-x86 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Magick.NET-Q8-x64. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Magick.NET-Q8-x64 to 14.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5vx3-wx4q-6cj8 across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.