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GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6

HIGH

Buildah allows build breakout using malicious Containerfiles and concurrent builds

Also known asCVE-2024-11218GO-2025-3414
Published
Jan 21, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk28th percentile+0.19%
0.00%0.29%0.57%0.86%0.1%0.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/containers/buildah🐹github.com/containers/buildah🐹github.com/containers/buildah🐹github.com/containers/buildah

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

With careful use of the --mount flag in RUN instructions in Containerfiles, and by using either multi-stage builds with use of concurrently-executing build stages (e.g., using the --jobs CLI flag) or multiple separate but concurrently-executing builds, a malicious Containerfile can be used to expose content from the build host to the command being run using the RUN instruction. This can be used to read or write contents using the privileges of the process which is performing the build. When that process is a root-owned podman system service which is provided for use by unprivileged users, this includes the ability to read and write contents which the client should not be allowed to read and write, including setuid executables in locations where they can be later accessed by unprivileged users.

Patches

Patches have been merged to the main branch, and will be added to upcoming releases on the release-1.38, release-1.37, release-1.35, and release-1.33 branches.

This addressed a number of Jira cards, but primarily https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-67616 and https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-67618, which were then vendored into Podman and backported into olde rbranches.

Workarounds

Mandatory access controls should limit the access of the process performing the build, on systems where they are enabled.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/buildah1.38.0&&< 1.38.11.38.1
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/buildah1.37.0&&< 1.37.61.37.6
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/buildah1.35.0&&< 1.35.51.35.5
🐹Gogithub.com/containers/buildahall versions1.33.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/containers/buildah. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/containers/buildah to 1.38.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact With careful use of the `--mount` flag in RUN instructions in Containerfiles, and by using either multi-stage builds with use of concurrently-executing build stages (e.g., using the `--jobs` CLI flag) or multiple separate but concurrently-executing builds, a malicious Containerfile can be used to expose content from the build host to the command being run using the RUN instruction. This can be used to read or write contents using the privileges of the process which is performing the build. When that process is a root-owned podman system service which is provided for use by unprivi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5vpc-35f4-r8w6 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.